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A STRATEGY FOR IMPROVING TAX COMPLIANCE 
Rachelle Y. Holmes* 
The current U.S. deterrence-based tax enforcement regime is failing.  
Despite the continual passage of new penalties and reporting 
requirements, large businesses remain able to keep their income out of 
the reach of the federal treasury.  While the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) has struggled with the decreasing effectiveness of its 
enforcement efforts, jurisdictions, such as Australia, have been able to 
achieve increased compliance rates as a result of transitioning to a 
cooperative tax model.  This type of regime focuses on resolving 
emerging taxpayer issues in real-time, providing taxpayers with 
helpful, readily available guidance, and creating positive incentives 
for compliant taxpayers, such as the ability to book tax benefits more 
quickly and with lower compliance costs. 
This Article argues for an adoption of a cooperative tax regime in the 
U.S., and more importantly proposes a framework for its 
implementation.  Because many businesses are already able to 
successfully game the current system, they may be reluctant to 
voluntarily cooperate with the IRS based on the mere expectation of 
cooperation-based benefits.  In order to combat this resistance, this 
Article argues that the IRS will have to delineate sharper compliance 
choices for taxpayers by broadening the spectrum of applicable 
compliance standards. 
This Article proposes that the IRS implement a system in which non-
cooperation is met with strict liability and heightened compliance 
standards, while cooperation is rewarded with expanded pre-filing 
programs, decreased liability standards, and lower compliance costs.  
When faced with these two choices, most taxpayers should, over time, 
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INTRODUCTION 
Large business entities (LBEs)1 and the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS or Service) are locked in an ongoing battle over revenue.  In this 
tax war, savvy LBEs facing daunting competition from their global 
counterparts are responding aggressively by minimizing all undue costs, 
including the money they willingly hand over to the federal 
government.2  Although tactical implementations among LBEs do vary, 
most strive to adeptly navigate the gray line between patently 
impermissible “tax evasion” and questionable “tax avoidance”3 by 
exploiting weaknesses in the tax law while complying with the black 
letter rules directly on point.4  On the opposing side of the field is the 
IRS, which can rightfully be categorized as the underdog because it is at 
a systematic disadvantage to the LBEs.  The U.S. tax system relies 
heavily on the self-reporting of transactions through the filing of tax 
returns.  LBEs are able to report their transactions as aggressively as 
they deem feasible.  The IRS, through audits, is then assigned with the 
daunting task of auditing the returns, discovering and assessing any 
offending transactions, and ultimately fighting with the LBEs about the 
proper amount of taxes owed.  Often understaffed and outwitted, IRS 
 1. As referred to herein, LBEs include corporations and pass-through entities with $250 million 
or more in gross assets. 
 2. Many global competitors have the advantage of being located in low- or no-tax jurisdictions.  
The U.S. corporate tax system is increasingly perceived, both domestically and abroad, as being 
disadvantaged in many respects, including its relatively high statutory corporate tax rates and unduly 
complex tax provisions.  See generally Compliance Concerns Relative to Large and Mid-Size 
Businesses: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Finance, 109th Congress 1 (2006) (Written Testimony of 
Mark Everson, Commissioner of Internal Revenue) [hereinafter Everson Compliance Report] (“[LBE] 
taxpayers are sophisticated, well-capitalized, well-organized, and adept at planning.  Particularly in the 
case of public companies, they are driven to show high after-tax profitability to shareholders in a very 
competitive and complex economic environment.  They have the resources and willingness to 
aggressively defend and contest tax positions.”). 
 3. As referred to herein, “tax evasion” is an impermissible failure to comply with the tax laws, 
which can result in potentially large penalties and criminal sanctions.  “Tax avoidance” is the legal, but 
IRS-disapproved, minimization or elimination of taxes through structures which often exploit loopholes 
and other weaknesses in the law.  Although not illegal, many tax avoidance transactions would be 
challenged or disrupted by the IRS if discovered.  See generally Michael Doran, Tax Penalties and Tax 
Compliance, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 111, 124 n.69 (2009) (explaining the “familiar but elusive 
distinction” between tax avoidance and tax evasion). 
 4. Former IRS Commissioner Mark Everson noted that as “the Code continues to expand, 
becoming more complex and challenging to administer, [LBEs] are able to utilize every available 
resource to explore opportunities to reduce their tax liability by using the most intricate and complicated 
Code provisions . . . .”  Offshore Abuses: The Enablers, the Tools, and Offshore Secrecy: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs’ Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, 109th 
Cong. 2 (2006) (Testimony of Mark Everson, Comm’r of Internal Revenue Serv.).  See also Sheldon D. 
Pollack, Tax Complexity, Reform, and the Illusion of Tax Simplification, 94 TAX NOTES TODAY 249-75 
(1994) (noting there is no shortage of methods by which taxpayers can engage in tax avoidance 
schemes). 
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agents have resorted to using every penalty, sanction, procedural tactic, 
threat, and common law doctrine available in their arsenal to capture the 
elusive LBE income base for the U.S. Treasury chest.5 
Not surprisingly, both sides of this game have developed enormous 
amounts of mistrust and resentment towards their opponent as they try to 
defend their diametrically opposed economic interests.  After all, the 
stakes of this battle are extremely high.  The proliferation of 
sophisticated evasion techniques and aggressively structured tax 
products results in billions of dollars in lost tax revenue each year to the 
U.S. fisc.6  Not only is there no shortage of methods by which taxpayers 
can engage in tax avoidance and evasion transactions, but also LBEs and 
their advisors have become particularly masterful at masking these 
transactions from detection by IRS agents, who would undoubtedly shut 
them down if discovered.  The U.S. Treasury and many practitioners 
agree this phenomenon has created a crisis of sorts in the U.S. tax 
system and is responsible for the escalating feelings of distrust and 
suspicion among LBEs and the IRS.7 
Congress and the IRS have employed a number of measures to curtail 
this trend.  In particular, a command-and-control deterrence-based 
approach has dominated their reform efforts and has resulted in a 
heightened focus on augmenting sanctions and penalties.8  These 
 5. See generally David M. Schizer, Enlisting the Tax Bar, 59 TAX L. REV. 331, 335–36 (2006) 
(describing the Service’s uphill enforcement battle).  See also infra notes 105–108 and accompanying 
text (enumerating recent rules and regulations aimed at procuring taxpayer compliance). 
 6. It is estimated that the U.S. corporate tax gap, that is the amount of revenue the U.S. 
estimates it should receive from corporations less the amount of revenue it voluntarily and timely 
collects, is approximately $30 billion.  Everson Compliance Report, supra note 2, at 2 (“The National 
Research Program (NRP) results provided last February estimate the underreporting non-compliance by 
larger corporations in 2001 to be $25 billion.  The estimate for all corporations is $30 billion.”).  The 
IRS estimated “that abusive corporate tax shelters contributed $10 to $15 billion of the $30 billion in 
unreported . . . corporate income taxes.”  James Bickley, CRS Updates Report on Proposals to Narrow 
Tax Gap, 2009 TAX NOTES TODAY 145-26 (2009). 
 7. Daniel N. Shaviro, Economic Substance, Corporate Tax Shelters, and the Compaq Case, 88 
TAX NOTES 221, 230 (2000); see also Allen Kenney, Tax Enforcement Makes GAO’s 2005 List of High-
Risk Areas, 106 TAX NOTES 531, 531 (2005) (“‘Given the broad declines in IRS’s enforcement 
workforce, IRS’s decreased ability to follow up on suspected noncompliance, the emergence of 
sophisticated evasion concerns, and the unknown effect of these trends on voluntary compliance, IRS is 
challenged on virtually all fronts in attempting to ensure that taxpayers fulfill their obligations . . . .’” 
(quoting Government Accountability Office report)). 
 8. Valerie Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation and Taxation: Introduction, 29 LAW & POL’Y 3, 
4 (2007) (noting the current U.S. tax administration has a “command-and-control operational system to 
accomplish their mission of catching ‘the scoundrels’ who do not pay their tax”).  The deterrence 
doctrine can be traced back to the classic work of Jeremy Bentham.  JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF 
PENAL LAW (1788), reprinted in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 365 (William Tait ed., 1859).  
The basic premise of his classic utilitarian theory of crime is that people are rational actors who behave 
in a manner that will maximize their expected utility.  In other words, individuals assess opportunities 
and risks and disobey the law when the anticipated fine and probability of being caught are small in 
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deterrence-based tactics are not yielding their desired results, primarily 
because detection and penalty rates cannot realistically exist at levels 
that will meaningfully deter wrongdoing.9  As a result, notwithstanding 
the onslaught of new fines and penalties, LBEs still are able to 
consistently keep their income out of the reach of the fisc.10 
As an alternative to the government’s current approach, this Article 
argues for the adoption of a cooperative, as opposed to deterrence-based, 
tax regime,11 and proposes a framework for its implementation.  In a 
recent article, Alex Raskolnikov suggested that the IRS use information-
forcing mechanisms to reveal taxpayer motives in order to enable a more 
efficient targeting of tax enforcement efforts.12  His intuition of 
separating so-called “gamers” from “non-gamers” for enforcement 
purposes can also be used to induce non-cooperating LBE taxpayers to 
become cooperators by applying a dynamic sorting mechanism to the 
pre-filing process.  In particular, this Article argues that by making strict 
liability the default for LBE taxpayers and simultaneously opening up 
access to pre-filing resolution programs, the IRS will be able to jump 
start the transition of the current command-and-control regime into a 
cooperative one. 
A cooperative model of tax regulation has the potential to provide a 
better foundation for taxpayer compliance, not only in the immediate 
relation to the profits to be made through non-compliance.  Becker expanded on this model by arguing 
that authorities needed to find an appropriate balance between increasing sanctions and increasing 
detection rates to make compliance behavior the rational economic choice.  Gary S. Becker, Crime and 
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).  For criticism of Becker’s analysis, 
see, for example, Nicholas Stern, On the Economic Theory of Policy Towards Crime, in ECONOMIC 
MODELS OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 123 (J. M. Heineke ed., 1978). 
 9. See generally Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, 
and the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569, 582 (2006).  This is true even with respect to 
LBEs that are under continuous audit. 
 10. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 11. In recent years, more scholars have begun to recognize the benefits of, and have begun to 
push for, a movement towards more cooperative tax regulation.  See generally Braithwaite, supra note 8, 
at 4; Dennis Ventry, Cooperative Tax Regulation, 41 CONN. L. REV. 431, 436 (2008); Jenny Job et al., 
Culture Change in Three Taxation Administrations: From Command-and-Control to Responsive 
Regulation, 29 LAW & POL’Y 84 (2007).  Hallmarks of a cooperative regime include: (i) rewarding 
cooperation and compliance; (ii) allowing taxpayers to obtain certainty on tax issues on a real-time 
basis; (iii) advocating taxpayer assistance, rather than abuse; (iv) sanctioning small violations mildly and 
serious violations heavily; and (v) enhancing penalties for the non-cooperative.  Id.; Edward J. 
McCaffery & Joel Slemrod, Toward an Agenda for Behavioral Public Finance 20 (CLEO Research 
Paper No. C04-22, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=590201 
(describing policy recommendations of “tax morale” literature). 
 12. Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax Enforcement, 
109 COLUM. L. REV. 689 (2009).  See also Lawrence Zelenak, Tax Enforcement for Gamers: High 
Penalties or Strict Disclosure Rules?, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 55 (2009) (critiquing 
Raskolnikov’s proposal). 
5
Holmes: FORCING COOPERATION: A STRATEGY FOR IMPROVING TAX COMPLIANCE
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011
H-HOLMES 8/27/2011  5:09:08 PM 
1420 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
 
future, but going forward as well.13  Although penalties and fines still 
need to exist as a baseline level for enforcement, the purely adversarial 
nature of command-and-control tax regulation fosters increased 
resentment and mistrust by taxpayers, which ultimately results in greater 
resistance and non-compliance.14  A cooperative tax regime can be 
superior to an adversity-based one because it can cultivate an 
environment where otherwise resistant taxpayers and tax regulators are 
willing to “trade secrecy for certainty.”15  This type of cooperative 
model will allow taxpayers to obtain certainty with respect to their tax 
positions pre-filing and thus allow them to book tax benefits 
immediately for financial accounting purposes.16  It will also make them 
subject to fewer resource-consuming post-filing challenges, audits, and 
adjustments.  At the same time, if a taxpayer is willing to have an 
ongoing transparent dialogue with government agents, the IRS will be 
better positioned to identify emerging compliance issues and risks, and 
more effectively allocate its limited resources.17  Thus, from both a 
present-day and long-term perspective, cooperative tax regulation can 
yield superior benefits to the current deterrence-based regime for both 
taxpayers and tax regulators.18 
 13. Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. 
REV. 71, 83–84 (2003) (suggesting that governments should encourage reciprocal compliance behavior 
by emphasizing other taxpayers’ compliance rather than the possibility of audit); Steven M. Sheffrin & 
Robert K. Triest, Can Brute Deterrence Backfire? Perceptions and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance, 
in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 193, 214 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) 
(“Increased enforcement efforts [in the area of tax compliance] might result in a perverse indirect 
increase in future noncompliance if the enforcement mechanism reveals to the affected taxpayer (and 
associates) that it is relatively easy to get away with evasion.”); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE 
LAW (2006) (finding that people are more likely to comply voluntarily with laws when they perceive 
that those laws are enforced through fair procedures). 
 14. Kristina Murphy, Enforcing Tax Compliance: To Punish or Persuade?, 38 ECON. ANALYSIS 
& POL’Y 112, 128 (2008) (study of 652 tax offenders in Australia suggested that “in order to prevent 
possible re-offending after an enforcement experience, regulators should aim to adopt enforcement 
procedures that emphasize reintegration and the fair treatment of offenders”); Marsha Blumenthal, 
Charles Christian & Joel Slemrod, Do Normative Appeals Affect Tax Compliance? Evidence from a 
Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 125 (2001); Doreen McBarnet, When 
Compliance is Not the Solution but the Problem: From Changes in Law to Changes in Attitude, in 
TAXING DEMOCRACY: UNDERSTANDING TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 229 (Valerie Braithwaite ed., 
2003) [hereinafter McBarnet, TAXING DEMOCRACY]. 
 15. For instance, taxpayers desirous of certainty with respect to uncertain tax items would be 
willing to get input from the IRS on the tax treatment of their transactions pre-filing in order to book the 
purported tax benefit for accounting purposes, even though the IRS may not have otherwise detected the 
transaction in audit.  See Ventry, supra note 11, at 436. 
 16. See infra Part III.A (discussing the new financial accounting regulations). 
 17. See Ventry, supra note 11, at 436. 
 18. In fact, Australia, which also was suffering high levels of noncompliance, completely 
overhauled its deterrence-based regime and replaced it with a cooperative-based model.  Even taking 
into account the significant cultural and administrative difficulties that were encountered as a result of 
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Even if a cooperative tax regime is superior to a contentious one, the 
question remains: Given their long history of mistrust, how can the IRS 
and taxpayers transition into such a relationship?  In this tax game, the 
players have a deeply rooted antagonistic posture towards each other.  
Although greater gains for both sides may realistically be achieved 
through cooperation, neither side is willing to give up any ground based 
on their justified suspicion as to the other side’s motives.  Because 
taxpayers are currently on the winning side of the war, they have very 
little incentive to abandon their current strategies with the IRS.  As long 
as the money and resources they spend to develop innovative tax 
avoidance structures outweigh the present value of any potential 
penalties and fines that may be levied upon detection, most taxpayers 
will continue their status quo.19  Some scholars have suggested that 
encouraging taxpayer participation in the regulatory process and offering 
rewards such as tax rebates to compliers can help transition taxpayers to 
a more cooperative model.20  Others have focused on the need for 
changing the attitudes and cultures of the regulators.21  This Article, 
however, argues that in order to effectively spur a transition to a 
cooperative regime, the IRS will have to first make a decisive move that 
will significantly change the playing field for LBEs. 
Part I of this Article discusses the failures of the current deterrence-
based tax compliance model.  Part II provides an overview of the 
Service’s ad hoc attempts at cooperative regulation, which focus on pre-
filing resolutions of taxpayer issues.  Part III argues that a 
comprehensive cooperative approach to tax regulation would be 
beneficial to both taxpayers and the IRS.  It further analyzes Australia’s 
conversion into cooperative tax regulation as a potential model for an 
effective approach.  Part IV outlines how the United States should work 
towards forcing a comprehensive cooperative regulation regime for 
LBEs by combining a heightened liability standard with expanded pre-
filing resolution programs.  It also explores challenges that the IRS may 
face and acknowledges ancillary consequences that may ensue as a 
this drastic change in culture, initial reports have demonstrated substantial improvements in collections 
and compliance.  For a fuller discussion of Australia’s reform, see infra Part III.E. 
 19. It is worthwhile to note, however, that some LBEs, even when on the right side of the law, 
have backed away from some strategies for fear of public shaming that may be associated with tax 
avoidance schemes.  See, e.g. Michael Kirsch, Alternative Sanctions and the Federal Tax Law: Symbols, 
Shaming, and Social Norm Management as a Substitute for Effective Tax Policy, 89 IOWA L. REV. 863 
(2004) (discussing ways in which Congress has resorted to shaming practices in order to discourage 
undesirable taxpayer behaviors, such as banning corporations who have moved their tax residence 
offshore from entering into certain U.S. government contracts). 
 20. Ventry, supra note 11, at 436. 
 21. Job et al., supra note 11, at 86; Sagit Leviner, A New Era of Tax Enforcement: From ‘Big 
Stick’ to Responsive Regulation, 42 U. MICH J.L. REFORM 381, 382 (2009). 
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result of the proposed forced cooperative model. 
I. FAILURES OF THE TRADITIONAL DETERRENCE MODEL 
Direct enforcement is often the cheapest and most effective way to 
deter wrongdoing and is the quintessential strategy for enforcing legal 
norms.22  However, when dealing with LBEs in the current tax regime, 
direct enforcement efforts that rely on the traditional deterrence model 
do not work.  Low detection rates, combined with inadequate penalties, 
and enormous information asymmetries, leave the IRS at a vast 
disadvantage in attempts to restrain taxpayers from taking overly 
aggressive or abusive positions on their tax returns.  Not only is the 
deterrence model unable to function to effectively prevent taxpayer 
wrongdoing (i.e. penalties and detection rates cannot realistically be 
made high enough to outweigh expected tax benefits), but also a model 
based strictly on deterrence does not fully explain the existing levels of 
compliance among LBE taxpayers given the relatively low penalty and 
detection rates.23  Moreover, the iron-gloved regulatory approach 
associated with the penalty and audit regimes fosters an environment of 
mistrust and perpetrates an antagonistic relationship between LBEs and 
the Service. 
From a purely logistical standpoint, the IRS cannot feasibly review 
the majority of the nearly 10 million business returns it receives each 
year.24  As a result, audit rates, and ergo opportunities for misconduct 
detection, are invariably low, leaving taxpayers often happy to play the 
so called “audit lottery.”25  This is true even with respect to non-de 
 22. Reinier Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 53, 56 (1986). 
 23. This is in part due to the secondary information reporting that the IRS is able to get from 
LBEs, which makes a large portion of their earnings known to the IRS.  There is some level of 
compliance, however, that may be more linked to norm or other social based models.  See generally 
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, A Tax Morale Approach to Compliance: Recommendations for the IRS, 8 FLA. 
TAX REV. 599, 612–17 (2007).  See also Raskolnikov, supra note 12, at 696–97 (citing the non-
exhaustive list of alternative “nonrational” explanations to include being guided by a sense of duty, 
complying out of habit, and reflecting perceptions of fairness of the tax burden); Eric A. Posner, Law 
and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781, 1794–98 (2000) (positing that 
the effects of the negative signals that noncompliance may bring to the evading taxpayer can add 
significant weight to the cost–benefit analysis calculation); James Andreoni, Brian Erard & Jonathan 
Feinstein, Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 818, 819, 841–43 (1998); Agnar Sandmo, The Theory of 
Tax Evasion: A Retrospective View, 58 NAT’L TAX J. 643, 649–50 (2005). 
 24. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FISCAL YEAR 2009 ENFORCEMENT RESULTS (2010) [hereinafter 
IRS FY 2009 RESULTS], available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/fy_2009_enforcement_results.pdf.  
Business returns include small and large corporation returns and subchapter S and partnership pass 
through returns.  Id. at 4. 
 25. See generally Raskolnikov, supra note 9, at 582. 
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minimis corporate taxpayers.  In fact the audit rate for corporations with 
$250 million or more in assets, which account for more than 75% of 
total corporate tax revenue, was just over 25% in the 2009 fiscal year.26  
Thus, although a select number of top-income corporations are under 
continuous audit, nearly three-quarters of corporate LBEs go unaudited 
each year.  As indicated in Figure 1 below, the audit rate for corporate 
LBEs has been dropping dramatically over the past five years, and is 
significantly down from the 44% rate in the 2005 fiscal year.  Even 
among the largest of these corporations—those with assets of $5 billion 
or more—the audit rate has declined 17% over the last two years, from 
78% in 2007 to 64% in 2009.27  Although some of this reduction is due 
to a strategic shift in audit resources to large pass-through entities, which 
comprise an ever-growing segment of business tax filers, much of the 




IRS Audits of Corporations with $250M or More in Assets29 
 No. of Returns No. of Audits % Audited 
FY 2005 11,018 4,859 44.1% 
FY 2006 12,148 4,276 35.2% 
FY 2007 12,588 3,424 27.2% 
FY 2008 13,336 3,654 27.4% 
FY 2009 14,673 3,771 25.7% 
 
Even if the IRS does audit a taxpayer’s return, the auditors may not 
have the time or requisite experience to intuit what particular 
transactions the taxpayer has in fact engaged in, or what areas of the 
return require more in-depth probing.  For example, the typical tax 
return of a large multinational taxpayer can be thousands of pages 
long.30  The filings for large pass-thru entities can be even more 
 
 26. IRS FY 2009 Results, supra note 24; Internal Revenue Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, No. 
4198 (7-2010), 2010 Tax Statistics (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/ 
10taxstatscard.pdf; Syracuse Univ., IRS Face-to-Face Audits of Federal Income Tax Returns Filed by 
Corporations, http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/trends/v15/corporations.html (last visited June 13, 2011). 
 27. Syracuse Univ., Despite Rising Deficits, IRS Audits of the Largest and Richest Corporations 
Decline, http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/newfindings/v15/#table4 (last visited June 13, 2011). 
 28. See, e.g., Michael Joe, IRS Enforcement Revenue Slips in Fiscal 2008, 2008 TAX NOTES 
TODAY 247-51. 
 29. IRS FY 2009 RESULTS, supra note 24.  The IRS fiscal year runs from October 1 through 
September 30. 
 30. IRS Releases Tax Season Statistics on Business Return Filings, 2007 TAX NOTES TODAY 71-
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complex.  Field agents, understandably, may have significant difficulty 
detecting wrongdoing by the taxpayer.  Not only is the sheer volume of 
information daunting, but questionable tax positions can be hidden 
among or lumped in with other non-controversial items.31  Taxpayers 
even intentionally throw the auditors off the trail by adding unnecessary 
entities or elements to their transactions in order to disguise abusive or 
questionable items they may have on the return.32  As such, even if the 
IRS were able to achieve a 100% audit rate for all LBEs, the ability for 
auditors to discover and collect revenues from offending transactions is 
significantly compromised and insufficient to meaningfully deter 
wrongdoing. 
When taxpayers are able to rely, not only on low detection rates, but 
also on penalty defenses and low government detection and enforcement 
success as well, the ex ante calculus of whether to enter into an 
aggressive transaction can heavily favor pushing the envelope as far as 
possible.  First, even if the questionable transaction is detected, 
reasonable basis and good faith defenses are available with respect to 
non-tax shelter transactions, which may bar the imposition of any 
penalties.33  Furthermore, even if penalties are imposed, the actual 
penalty level will be low relative to the detection risk.  Indeed, given a 
detection rate of 26%, penalties would need to be increased dramatically 
in order for the expected economic value of the taxpayer’s tax benefit to 
be low enough to deter them from entering into the transaction.34 
Assuming that a non-compliant LBE does not engage in criminal 
misconduct, the largest penalty that it can expect is a 75% fraud 
penalty.35  More likely, however, the penalty would only be a 20% or 
40% accuracy penalty.36  Assuming a maximum penalty of 75% and an 
average detection rate equal to the audit rate of 26%, a taxpayer’s 
expected cost of avoiding a $100 tax liability would be only $45.50—an 
amount equal to less than half of the $100 expected cost of paying the 
tax liability up front with the initial return.  Assuming a more realistic 
maximum penalty of 20% and a detection rate equal to half the audit rate 
13. 
 31. See Raskolnikov, supra note 9, at 572. 
 32. See Schizer, supra note 5, at 331. 
 33. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 34. Doran, supra note 3, at 126–27; Ventry, supra note 11, at 439–40. 
 35. I.R.C. § 6663(a) (2006).  The IRS has the burden of proving fraud by clear and convincing 
evidence.  Id. § 6663(b). 
 36. Taxpayers engaged in non-reportable or non-tax shelter transactions are generally subject to a 
20% accuracy-related penalty on underpayments of tax that are due to negligence or disregard of the 
rules or to understatements that are “substantial.”  I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1) (West 2010).  The penalty 
increases to 40% if the underpayment is the result of a gross valuation misstatement.  Id. § 6662(h)(1). 
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(i.e., misconduct is detected by an IRS audit 50% of the time), the 
taxpayer’s expected cost of avoiding a $100 tax liability would be only 
$15.60.  Accordingly, in order for the deterrence model to be effective 
even under the most stringent assumptions, taxpayers would need to be 
subject to penalties in excess of 285%.37  Inarguably, penalties at this 
level would not be politically feasible because notwithstanding the 
deterrent effects, public and political perception remains that tax 
penalties should approximately correlate to the severity of the offense 
which is being penalized.38 
Additionally, while the deterrence model surely accounts for some 
baseline level of LBE taxpayer compliance, it does not adequately 
explain a great portion of it.  If the deterrence model was solely 
responsible for guiding LBE behavior, LBEs generally would only pay a 
fraction of the total taxes they owe.39  Other controls, however, such as 
withholding and independent reporting obligations (e.g., those made to 
the Securities and Exchange Commission), are in place.  Thus, with 
respect to a significant portion of LBE income, the compliance rate is 
high because secondary or backup information controls are in place to 
help restrain taxpayer misbehavior.  However, at any given income 
level, the actual amount of tax liability due can vary greatly.  Therefore, 
a large part of the tax gap with respect to LBEs does not hinge on hiding 
income per se, but rather on the way in which the taxpayer’s income is 
manipulated and reported for tax purposes.  As discussed above, the IRS 
agents must navigate thousands of pages of data in order to untangle or 
reverse engineer an LBE’s transaction reporting and ultimately deduce a 
“proper” tax liability figure.40  This can be a daunting or even 
impossible task for the resource-restrained government.  Accordingly, a 
more cooperative model in which the IRS could gain insight pre-filing 
as to the manner and methods by which LBE taxpayers are reporting 
transactions, should significantly improve compliance statistics. 
 37. Assumes a 75% penalty rate and 26% detection rate. 
 38. Indeed, numerous criticisms have already been raised regarding the IRS’s disproportionate 
level of penalties, including the stacking of penalties that can now occur when taxpayers are engaged in 
listed or tax haven transactions.  Stuart M. Lewis, White Paper on Tax Penalty Reform, 2009 TAX 
NOTES TODAY 75-25.  Moreover, in June of 2009, Congress asked the IRS to suspend its enforcement of 
the harsh § 6707A $200,000 strict liability penalty for nondisclosure, believing that it was too punitive 
and excessive with respect to the small-business owners against whom it was being assessed.  The IRS 
complied and acknowledged that in many cases the penalty was disproportionate to the tax savings.  
Douglas Shulman, Letter by IRS Commissioner Douglas Shulman, 2009 TAX NOTES TODAY 128-15. 
 39. Doran, supra note 3, 126–27. 
 40. See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text. 
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II. TESTING THE WATERS: IRS ATTEMPTS AT COOPERATIVE REGULATION 
The concept of cooperative regulation is not entirely foreign to the 
IRS.  For a long time, the IRS has worked with taxpayers to resolve 
certain issues, pre-filing through the private letter ruling (PLR) process.  
During the last decade, several additional pre-filing programs, most 
notably the pre-filing agreement (PFA) program and the Compliance 
Assurance Program (CAP), have been put in place, which require 
significant levels of taxpayer–IRS cooperation.41  These programs, 
although undoubtedly steps in the right direction, are currently too 
limited in scope and application as they comprise only a small part of 
the otherwise command-and-control centered regulatory tax regime.  
Furthermore, as implemented these initiatives do not truly embrace 
certain hallmarks of cooperative regulation, such as responsiveness, 
inclusiveness, and trust. 
A. Private Letter Rulings 
Through the PLR process, a taxpayer desiring a written ruling from 
the IRS regarding the tax status or effects of its transactions before filing 
a return can submit a written inquiry and fee of up to $14,000 to the IRS 
Associate Chief Counsel Office.42  PLRs are then issued at the 
discretion of the Service when they are deemed “appropriate in the 
interest of sound tax administration.”43  The IRS will interpret and apply 
the applicable tax laws to the specific taxpayer’s set of facts.44  Within 
twenty-one days after a PLR request has been made, an IRS official will 
meet with the taxpayer to inform him, if possible, whether the eventual 
ruling will be favorable or adverse.45  Once the process is complete, a 
PLR is then issued and is authoritative with respect to that specific 
taxpayer, assuming it adheres to the proposed form of transaction and 
 41. In 2001, the IRS also piloted the Fast Track Settlement (FTS) process, which is a non-
binding negotiation process between the taxpayer and revenue Agents or the Team Manager with the 
assistance of an Appeals Official acting as a neutral third party.  IRS Notice 2001-67, 2001-2 C.B. 544 
(establishing pilot FTS program); Rev. Proc. 2003-40, 2003-1 C.B. 1044 (setting forth the procedures 
for FTS).  One of the most significant objectives of FTS is reducing the time it takes to resolve a dispute.  
In many cases, the IRS has achieved this objective of appreciably shortening the time frame; given the 
specified time limitation of 120 days from start to finish, in many cases taxpayers and the IRS have cut 
two years or more from the resolution time.  Pamela F. Olson & David B. Robison, Recently Developed 
IRS Audit and Dispute Resolution Techniques, in TAX LAW & PRACTICE 841, 865 (PLI Tax Law & 
Estate Planning Series, Course Handbook Series No. 855, 2008). 
 42. Rev. Proc. 2010-1, § 2.01, app. A, 2010-1 I.R.B 1. 
 43. Id. § 2.01. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. § 8.02. 
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there are no material changes in law.46  All PLRs are then published in 
redacted form and often serve as helpful guidance for other taxpayers, 
although only the original taxpayer is entitled to rely on the ruling.47 
There are significant limitations on the types of issues the IRS will 
address through the PLR process.  It will not issue letters where the 
determination requested is primarily one of fact.48  It will also not issue 
a determination on the tax effect of a hypothetical or indefinite future 
transaction.49  Thus, the IRS generally issues a PLR on a proposed 
transaction or on a completed transaction if the ruling request is 
submitted before the return is filed for the year in which the transaction 
is completed.50  PLRs are also not issued with respect to any transaction 
having a major purpose of reducing taxes.51  The IRS generally will not 
issue a PLR if the applicable law is unclear or unknown.52  If the issue 
cannot be readily resolved through the straightforward application of the 
taxpayer’s facts to the tax statutes, regulations, or other published 
guidance, generally no ruling will be issued.53  In addition to these 
limitations, the IRS has developed an extensive list of topics for which 
they will not issue PLRs, including international issues.54 
Because of these limitations, many LBEs are unable to fully 
maximize the potential afforded by the PLR process.  LBEs generally 
employ sophisticated in-house personnel who are able to handle 
straightforward applications of existing law to facts.  Pre-filing guidance 
would be most useful to LBEs in situations where the applicable law is 
unclear.  Additionally, most LBEs are multinational and the exclusion of 
most international issues also significantly limits the utility of the PLR 
process.  The reluctance of the IRS to tackle the more intricate issues 
relevant to LBEs has garnered criticism.55  In addition, the number of 
PLRs issued by the Service has dropped from over 5,000 in 1980 to a 
 46. Id. § 11.01–.03. 
 47. Id. § 11.02; I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3) (West 2010). 
 48. Treas. Reg. § 601.201(s)(2) (as amended in 2002). 
 49. Id. § 601.201(d)(2); Rev. Proc. 2010-1, § 6.12, 2010-1 I.R.B. 1. 
 50. Rev. Proc. 2010-1, § 5.01, 2010-1 I.R.B. 1.  Furthermore, the IRS will issue PLRs in all cases 
when a prospective transaction is required by law to have a determination as to the tax consequences, 
such as I.R.C. § 367 exchanges.  Treas. Reg. § 601.201(d)(3). 
 51. Treas. Reg. § 601.201(s)(2). 
 52. Rev. Proc. 2010-1, § 5.14, 2010-1 I.R.B. 1. 
 53. Id. § 6.09. 
 54. Treas. Reg. § 601.201(d)(2); Rev. Proc. 2010-1, § 6.02, 2010-1 I.R.B. 1.  In certain 
situations, however, the IRS may issue a ruling in an area that it has said it would not ordinarily issue 
one if there are unique and compelling reasons to do so.  Rev. Proc. 2010-7, § 2.01, 2010-1 I.R.B. 231. 
 55. See, e.g., Michael Desmond, Resolution of Financial Products Tax Controversies, in TAX 
LAW & PRACTICE 257, at 261 (PLI Tax Law & Estate Planning Series, Course Handbook Series No. 
860, 2009) (noting the scarcity of meaningful rulings in the financial products area). 
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little under 2,000 in 2009.56  A large portion of these rulings do not in 
fact address substantive tax issues, but rather involve mundane taxpayer 
requests to change accounting methods, obtain extensions, make election 
modifications, or confirm qualification for tax-free transactions.57 
In addition to these PLR limitations, the publication of the decisions 
is also a hurdle for LBEs.  Although PLRs are redacted to preserve 
anonymity when they are published, they still provide a detailed 
description of the facts giving rise to the ruling.58  This can be critical 
because LBEs engage in many sensitive or proprietary transactions with 
respect to which disclosure to the public, and in particular to their 
competitors, would be untenable. 
Thus, while the PLR process provides a potentially valuable resource 
for LBEs and the IRS to resolve taxpayer issues pre-filing, the 
limitations on the scope of issues involved and the public nature of the 
process often make it a less than ideal solution for LBEs.  As a result, 
these restrictions are stifling the Service’s ability to get in front of, 
versus merely reacting to, ongoing transactional and reporting issues that 
taxpayers are facing.  Unfortunately, similar deficiencies exist with the 
Service’s more recently implemented PFA and CAP programs. 
B. Pre-Filing Agreements 
In 2000, the IRS started an alternative, pre-examination compliance 
tool for Large and Midsize Business (LMSB) taxpayers known as the 
PFA program.59  The LMSB Division serves corporations, subchapter S 
corporations, and partnerships with assets greater than $10 million.60  
The PFA program is available to all LMSB taxpayers who have 
qualifying issues they would like resolved prior to filing their tax 
returns.61  Tax practitioners have hailed the use of PFAs as “superbly 
efficient and beneficial for both taxpayers and the Service,”62 and a 
representative of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
 56. Results yielded from search for PLRs issued during 1980 and 2009 on RIA/Checkpoint 
database. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Rev. Proc. 2010-1, § 11.02, 2010-1 I.R.B. 1. 
 59. Rev. Proc. 2001-22, 2001-1 C.B. 745.  On December 24, 2008, the IRS released Rev. Proc. 
2009-14, which effectively made permanent some minor tweaks made to the program in 2007 (in Rev. 
Proc. 2007-17) and some major changes made to the program in 2005 (in Rev. Proc. 2005-12).  Rev. 
Proc. 2009-14, 2009-3 I.R.B. 324. 
 60. IRS, Large & Mid-Size Business Division At-a-Glance, http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/ 
0,,id=96387,00.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2011). 
 61. Rev. Proc. 2009-14, § 3.01, 2009-3 I.R.B. 324. 
 62. Amy S. Elliott, Practitioners Praise Prefiling Agreement Program, 2009 TAX NOTES TODAY 
45-2. 
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(AICPA) noted that it has “been a win-win both for the companies and 
for the IRS, because it saves a lot on resources from both ends.”63  Even 
though many taxpayers and practitioners support the concept of the PFA 
program, many criticize its less than ideal implementation.  In particular, 
critics blame the Service’s narrow program scope, conservative 
implementation, heavy-handed Chief Counsel oversight, and aggressive 
fee structure as significant detractors from the program’s potential 
benefits.64 
1. Scope and Implementation 
As a threshold matter, to qualify for the PFA program a taxpayer’s 
request must relate to a transaction that is already complete and for 
which the related return has not been filed.65  PFAs cannot be used to 
determine the tax treatment of prospective or future transactions or 
events.66  Moreover, PFAs are only used for issues that require either: 
(1) a determination of facts or the application of well-established law to 
known facts; or (2) an agreement as to the methodology used by a 
taxpayer to determine the appropriate amount of an item of income, 
allowance, deduction, or credit.67  In addition, the PFA process is only 
available with respect to a limited number of international issues.68 
For both domestic and international related issues, the Service may, in 
its sole discretion, refuse to address an issue in a PFA based on 
considerations of sound tax administration, and the program requires 
LMSB to consult with the Office of Chief Counsel before any decision 
is made to proceed with the taxpayer’s request for a PFA.69  The Office 
of Chief Counsel’s involvement has been a source of contention for 
many taxpayers who feel that the Chief Counsel refuses many PFA 
requests because they improperly infringe on its office’s territory.70  
Whatever the reasoning, as demonstrated in Figure 2 below, the IRS has 
indeed exercised its broad discretion to refuse PFA requests by rejecting 
almost 35% of all applications. 
 63. Id. (quoting Benson S. Goldstein, a technical manager at AICPA). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Rev. Proc. 2009-14, § 1.02, 2009-3 I.R.B. 324. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. § 3.03(1), (2). 
 68. Id. § 3.06. 
 69. Id. §§ 3.05, 3.06. 
 70. Id. § 3.06.  See also Elliott, supra note 62, at 45-2 (citing both Daniel J. Wiles, a tax attorney 
with PricewaterhouseCoopers and former lawyer in the Chief Counsel’s office, and Mike Dolan, 
director in KPMG’s Washington National Tax Practice, as blaming the lack of Chief Counsel 
concurrence as the reason that many of their PFA applications are not being accepted). 
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Figure 2 
 
IRS Pre-Filing Agreements71 
 Received Accepted 
Closed with 
Agreement  
CY 2000 19 12 7  
CY 2001 26 18 5  
CY 2002 44 25 12  
CY 2003 42 29 18  
CY 2004 38 22 27  
CY 2005 53 29 19  
CY 2006 46 37 27  
CY 2007 29 20 20  
CY 2008 32 20 19  
CY 2009 28 21 15  
Total 357 233 169  
 
Similar to the PLR process, one of the frustrations that the tax 
community has with the existing PFA program is that the IRS is 
reluctant to address any “real issues,” the type of which many 
sophisticated LBE taxpayers would like resolved prior to filing.72  Not 
only do the present terms of the PFA limit their scope to the application 
of well-settled law to known facts (a situation for which a PFA may 
have only limited utility to an LBE), but the Service has also refused 
otherwise eligible PFA issues because they were considered too 
“controversial” in nature.73  This reluctance to tackle difficult issues 
severely limits the program’s utility to LBE taxpayers, particularly those 
with well-staffed, sophisticated lawyers who are able to conduct difficult 
analysis in areas where the law is well-settled.  One of the major benefits 
of the program, discussed further below in Part III.A, is that taxpayers 
will be able to get certainty prior to filing, which not only saves them 
money on penalty protection opinions and post-filing audit compliance 
costs, but also allows them to book tax benefits immediately, rather than 
creating reserves, under the Financial Accounting Standard Board’s 
 
 71. For the original statistics, see Pre-Fillment Agreement Program, http://www.irs.gov/ 
businesses/article/0,,id=102667,00.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2011). 
 72. Elliott, supra note 62, at 45-2 (quoting Daniel J. Wiles, a tax attorney with 
PricewaterhouseCoopers). 
 73. Id. 
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(FASB) Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48).74  Despite the purported 
potential benefits of this program, the IRS has accepted an average of 
less than twenty-four PFA applications each year.75 
2. The Fee 
In addition to the limited number of issues the IRS seems willing to 
address through the PFA process, another reason the number of actual 
applications is so low (an average of just over thirty-five per year) is that 
there is a $50,000 user fee to participate in the PFA program.76  The 
justification for this fee is that even though the program saves the 
Service money in the long-run, it is in fact a quite resource-intensive 
endeavor in the short-term.77  Prior to 2007, the IRS used a sliding scale 
mechanism to calculate the fee, with the highest amount charged being 
$10,000.  This jump in fees has purportedly turned away many 
midmarket LMSB taxpayers from the PFA program.  This assertion is 
consistent with the sudden drop-off in applications, illustrated in Figure 
2 above, which occurred in 2007.78  In addition, because all PFAs do not 
result in a resolution (as of 2009, over a quarter of PFAs have failed to 
result in a final agreement), smaller LMSB taxpayers may be even more 
hesitant to invest a significant amount of capital upfront with no 
assurances that the process will ultimately work out.  Thus, under the 
current PFA structure, the IRS has in place a program with significant 
upside potential, but that offers pre-filing resolutions for less complex 
issues that are of limited interest to larger taxpayers, at fee levels that 
only larger taxpayers may be willing to bear. 
C. Compliance Assurance Program 
In December 2005, as a follow up to the PFA program, which 
provides pre-filing resolution on an issue-by-issue basis, the IRS 
announced CAP, which allows pre-filing reviews of multiple taxpayer 
 74. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 48: ACCOUNTING FOR 
UNCERTAINTY IN INCOME TAXES: AN INTERPRETATION OF FASB STATEMENT NO. 109, NO. 281-B 
(2006) [hereinafter FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 48], available at http://www.fasb.org/cs/ 
BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175820931560&blob
header=application/pdf. 
 75. See supra Figure 2. 
 76. Rev. Proc. 2009-14, § 10.02, 2009-3 I.R.B. 324. 
 77. Elliott, supra note 62, at 45. 
 78. Although, as discussed infra in Part IV.C, some of the drop off may be due to more taxpayers 
moving into the CAP program. 
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issues at a time.79  CAP is a significant cooperation-based initiative in 
which select large business taxpayers undergo “real-time” audits by 
working closely with assigned IRS personnel such that taxpayers can 
have certainty on all material issues prior to filing their tax returns.  As 
outlined in the CAP pilot announcement, the Service requires taxpayers 
enrolled in the program to engage in “extensive cooperation,” which 
includes “full disclosure of information concerning their completed 
business transactions and their proposed return treatment of all material 
issues.”80  In return, successful participants in the program can minimize 
or eliminate the need for any post-filing examinations or adjustments.81  
CAP has received primarily positive reviews during its inaugural 
years.82  However, the program has drawn criticism due to its limited 
availability to only a handful of select taxpayers, its extensive 
administrative demands, its time delays, and its sometimes antagonistic 
implementations.83 
1. The CAP Process 
When a taxpayer enters CAP, the Service will assign it an “Account 
Coordinator.”84  The Account Coordinator serves as the primary point of 
contact with the Service for issue resolution.  The Account Coordinator 
reviews the taxpayer’s audit history and prior tax issues and becomes 
familiar with relevant industry trends and current business practices of 
the taxpayer.85  During the initial stages of CAP, the Account 
Coordinator works directly with the taxpayer to review business 
transactions, assess risk, identify compliance issues, and provide 
compliance guidance.  During the review and examination of the 
taxpayer’s compliance items, the Account Coordinator consults with 
Service specialists, appeals personnel, and Chief Counsel advisors.86 
 79. I.R.S. Ann. 2005-87, 2005-2 C.B. 1144 (Dec. 12, 2005). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See, e.g., Jeremiah Coder, The Future of the CAP Program, 2010 TAX NOTES TODAY 55-3 
(“IRS officials have touted the successes of the program and reported ‘overwhelmingly high’ customer 
satisfaction with the process.”). 
 83. Id. 
 84. I.R.S. Ann. 2005-87, 2005-2 C.B. 1144 (Dec. 12, 2005). 
 85. Id.  A standardized memorandum of understanding (MOU), which sets the ground rules for 
CAP, must be executed between each participating taxpayer and the assigned Account Coordinator.  The 
MOU defines specific objectives for the program, sets parameters for the disclosure of information, 
describes the methods of communication, and serves as a statement of the parties’ commitment to good-
faith participation in CAP.  Failure to comply with the terms of the MOU may result in removal of the 
taxpayer from the program.  Id. 
 86. Id. 
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CAP taxpayers that resolve all material issues with the Account 
Coordinator will be assured, prior to the filing of the tax return, that the 
IRS will accept their tax return, assuming it is filed consistent with all 
agreed-to resolutions, and that no post-filing examination will be 
required.87  If all material issues cannot be resolved prior to the filing of 
the return, the program will identify the remaining items that need to be 
resolved through the traditional examination processes.88  The taxpayer 
will retain access to all available appeal rights with respect to any 
traditional examination that is conducted.89  CAP operates on a year-to-
year basis and gives no promise of reducing or eliminating audit activity 
in future years.90  However, the number of CAP taxpayers that remain in 
the program as repeat participants is steadily increasing.91 
2. Who Is in CAP? 
CAP began as a pilot program with just seventeen hand-selected 
taxpayers, all of which asked to continue in the program for future 
cycles.92  Today, there are nearly one hundred total taxpayers involved 
in CAP.93  Almost all of these participants are Coordinated Industry 
Case (CIC) taxpayers, which means that they are large corporations 
from specified industries that meet a composite of various quantitative 
benchmarks (e.g., gross assets of at least $500 million; gross receipts of 
at least $1 billion; foreign assets of at least $250 million) and are 
regularly audited by LMSB examination teams.94 
A current significant limitation of CAP is that it is an invitation-only 
program and is not open to all taxpayers.  Only those companies that 
historically have exhibited a “high level of tax compliance behavior” are 
invited to participate in the program.95  Practitioners have complained 
that entry into the program needs to be greatly expanded and objective 
criteria for selection should be established.96  In order to counteract any 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Philip Tatarowicz et al., Internal Revenue Serv. Advisory Council, Large and Mid-Size 
Business Subgroup Report (Nov. 19, 2008) [hereinafter LMSB Subgroup Report], available at 
http://www.irs.gov/taxpros/article/0,,id=188491,00.html#_Toc213566359. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Pamela F. Olson and David B. Robison, Recently Developed IRS Audit and Dispute 
Resolution Techniques, in TAX LAW & PRACTICE 841, at 847 (PLI Tax Law & Estate Planning Series, 
Course Handbook Series 855, 2008). 
 93. LMSB Subgroup Report, supra note 90. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Coder, supra note 82. 
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perceived favoritisms, as the CAP program transitions out of its pilot 
phase and demand escalates, a less subjective process will undoubtedly 
need to be put in place. 
3. The CAP Report Card 
Overall, CAP participants have indicated that the ability to determine 
certainty in their tax reporting and focus on current issues are the key 
reasons they want to continue in the program.97  However, there have 
been a number of criticisms, particularly relating to actions of CAP 
exam teams.  Many of these concerns were brought forth in recent 
interviews done by Tax Analysts with practitioners working with 
taxpayer clients that are involved in CAP.98  Not surprisingly, almost 
none of the practitioners interviewed would do so on the record for fear 
of potential adverse consequences for their clients.99 
Among the complaints lodged is an overall concern about the 
continued antagonistic attitude of CAP participants from the IRS side, 
including an undue focus on administrative procedures rather than 
results.  As noted by one practitioner: “Some CAP exam teams have not 
embraced the concept behind the program and are still treating a CAP 
exam like a traditional audit, issuing comprehensive [information 
document requests] and such.”100  Similarly, another practitioner 
confessed that CAP “can be a very intrusive process, with the IRS exam 
team digging into issues that may not be necessary.”101  Other exam 
teams have acted in ways that are so antithetical to the philosophy of 
CAP that the participating taxpayers “have considered CAP to be 
oppressive, without the expected sharing leading to a limited focus.”102  
Thus, in order to sustain on-going interest in CAP, the IRS will need to 
ensure that its personnel buys into and demonstrates the cooperative 
spirit that CAP is intended to foster. 
 
 97. Olson & Robison, supra note 92, at 899. 
 98. Coder, supra note 82. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. (the same practitioner also noting that “here is a frustration that the increased compliance 
burden from reportable transaction reporting, Schedule M-3, and e-filing has done nothing to streamline 
the examination process”). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
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III. BENEFITS OF A COOPERATIVE APPROACH 
The current regime of fines, penalties, and post-filing audits has 
yielded no measurable improvement in tax compliance among large 
corporations.103  Indeed, over the past decade, although the statutory rate 
has not changed, the effective corporate tax rate has declined, and the 
general atmosphere of taxpayer–government hostility has risen with 
each passing year.104  As sophisticated taxpayers continue to out-
maneuver the under-staffed government, Congress and the IRS have 
repeatedly responded by instituting new, and more rigorous, deterrence-
focused penalties and reporting requirements in an effort to stem the tide 
of taxpayer non-compliance.  These response tactics have targeted 
taxpayers and tax advisors alike, and include increasing the penalties 
applicable to tax shelters,105 strengthening tax return preparer 
liability,106 greatly expanding the ethical rules governing tax practice,107 
and forcing increased reporting and disclosure.108
While the United States has continually struggled to make its 
command-and-control regime adequately capture the income of LBEs, 
in other jurisdictions, such as Australia, purposeful moves towards 
cooperative regulation have actually yielded increased voluntary 
 103. See generally Thomas Barthold, Testimony of the Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on 
Taxation Thomas A. Barthold Before the Select Revenue Measures Subcommittee of the House 
Committee on Ways and Means Hearing on Taxes as Part of the Federal Budget, 2010 TAX NOTES 
TODAY 56-47 (noting that over the years the percentage of corporate income tax revenues has declined). 
 104. Id. 
 105. See I.R.C. § 6700(a)(1)(B)(2)(B) (2006) (raising the shelter organizer penalty for a false 
statement from $1,000 to 50% of gross income derived from the activity); I.R.C. § 6707 (2006) 
(increasing the penalty for failure to register a tax shelter transaction from $500 to $50,000 for 
reportable transactions other than listed transactions and up to 75% of gross income derived from the 
activity for listed transactions); I.R.C. § 6707A (West 2010) (creating a new taxpayer penalty for failure 
to disclose a reportable transaction); I.R.C. § 6708 (2006) (establishing a new penalty which replaced 
the $50 penalty for failure to maintain investor lists under § 6112 with a $10,000 per day penalty for 
failure to turn over information upon request from the IRS); I.R.C. § 6662A (West 2010) (creating a new 
taxpayer 20% understatement penalty for reportable transactions, increased to 30% if not disclosed). 
 106. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3880 
(codified at I.R.C. § 6694(a)(2)(A)–(B)). 
 107. Treasury Dep’t Circular No. 230, 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.0-10.93 (2007). See, e.g., Regulations 
Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 69 Fed. Reg. 75,839, 75,844 (Dec. 20, 2004). 
 108. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6111-12, 6662A, 6707, 6707A.  See also Treasury and IRS Issue Revised 
Tax Form for Corporate Tax Returns, 2004 TAX NOTES TODAY 131-16 (noting that the IRS instituted a 
book-tax reconciliation initiative which requires large corporations to file Schedule M-3, which is used 
to reconcile their financial accounting net income to their taxable income and as an investigative tool for 
ferreting out tax shelters).  See also I.R.S. Ann. 2010-9, 2010-7 I.R.B. 408 (Jan. 26, 2010) (announcing a 
new proposal that would require corporations with more than $10 million in assets to report the 
maximum exposure they have for each “uncertain tax positions,” which primarily include those 
positions for which a tax reserve must be established under FIN 48, on a new schedule to be filed with 
their annual tax returns). 
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compliance rates.109  Such initiatives have focused on getting ahead of, 
instead of responding, to emerging taxpayer issues, providing taxpayers 
with helpful, readily available advice, assuring non-adversarial, 
respectful treatment during audits, and creating positive incentives for 
compliant taxpayers.110  A shift towards a cooperative tax regime in the 
United States could likewise yield significant benefits, including greater 
accounting benefits for taxpayers, heightened awareness of tax 
compliance norms, and decreased compliance costs for taxpayers and 
the government. 
A. Certainty Yields Benefits for FIN 48 
A traditional post-filing examination of a taxpayer’s return takes an 
average of fifty-two months to close.  This is an extraordinarily long 
time for a taxpayer to wait to gain certainty on their tax filing positions.  
While in the past, this lag time for “closing the books” may have been 
more palatable, recent accounting regulations have made LBEs subject 
to FASB much less tolerable of contingent tax liabilities. 
Under FIN 48, FASB now prohibits a company from booking a tax 
benefit unless the tax position will more likely than not be sustained on 
its merits.111  Thus, in preparing financial statements, a company must 
analyze each tax position and determine whether it meets the more likely 
than not standard.  If a position is unable to meet this threshold, the 
company cannot book the benefit until the uncertainty is resolved, and 
must disclose the position by showing a liability for the unrecognized 
tax benefit.112  A benefit failing the standard can only be subsequently 
booked on the financial statements if the position is favorably resolved 
with the IRS.113 
 109. See, e.g., Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax 
Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation, 29 LAW & POL’Y 102, 106–08 (2007) 
(arguing that respectful treatment by tax authorities leads to higher compliance, “particularly in [Swiss] 
cantons using referendums and initiatives in political decision-making”); Kent W. Smith, Reciprocity 
and Fairness: Positive Incentives for Tax Compliance, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE 
AND ENFORCEMENT 223, 246 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (concluding from data that “responsive service 
and procedural fairness are positive incentives that affect normative commitments to tax compliance”). 
 110. Id.  See also Michael Wenzel, Tax Compliance and the Psychology of Justice: Mapping the 
Field, in TAXING DEMOCRACY, supra note 14, at 55 (reporting studies showing that taxpayers value 
access to, and provision of, information by the Australian Tax Office). 
 111. FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 48, supra note 74, ¶ 6 (“The more-likely-than-not recognition 
threshold is a positive assertion that an enterprise believes it is entitled to the economic benefits 
associated with a tax position.  The determination of whether or not a tax position has met the more-
likely-than-not recognition threshold shall consider the facts, circumstances, and information available 
at the reporting date.”). 
 112. Id. ¶ 5. 
 113. Id. ¶ 3.  A company may also subsequently book the benefits if there is a law change which 
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Thus, under a cooperative approach, where a majority of major 
taxpayer issues can be resolved pre-filing,114 the benefits of immediate 
certainty are concrete.115  Taxpayers will be able to immediately book a 
tax benefit on their financial statements, without reserve, if a favorable 
determination on the issue is made during either the PFA or CAP 
process.116  The PFA process provides credible evidence of the value of 
certainty to LBEs because taxpayers have been willing to pay $50,000 in 
order to determine the outcome of a tax transaction in real-time rather 
than waiting two or more years for a final determination.117 
B. Lower Compliance and Enforcement Costs 
Pre-filing certainty of outcomes not only allows taxpayers to avoid 
booking tax reserves, but it also saves both taxpayers and the IRS the 
expenditure of significant amounts of time and money in anticipation of, 
preparing for, and in the process of post-filing battle.  IRS enforcement 
costs, which have steadily increased over the past five years, include the 
costs of conducting post-filing audits, contests, and litigation.118  The 
total number of IRS collection and enforcement personnel necessary to 
execute these functions has grown 11% since 2005.119 
Likewise, LBEs spend millions of dollars annually complying with 
and subsequently defending their reporting positions with respect to the 
tax laws.120  The overwhelming complexity of the tax rules can result in 
extremely high compliance costs for LBE taxpayers, even if they are 
pushes the likelihood of success over the 50% threshold or the statute of limitations applicable to the 
position lapses such that no further adjustments can be made.  Id. 
 114. For example, a CAP case only takes an average of 6.3 months to close.  Sam Young, Current 
Information Key to Good Tax Administration, IRS Official Says, 2008 TAX NOTES TODAY 211-8. 
 115. See I.R.S. Ann. 2005-87, 2005-2 C.B. 1144 (“CAP will allow taxpayers to better manage tax 
reserves and ensure more precise reporting of earnings on financial statements.”).  See also Elliott, supra 
note 62, at 45. 
 116. Olson & Robison, supra note 92, at 865. 
 117. Rev. Proc. 2009-14, § 10.02, 2009-3 I.R.B. 324. 
 118. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REPT. NO 2010-30-066, TRENDS IN 
COMPLIANCE ACTIVITIES THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 2009 (2010) [hereinafter TIGT FY2009 COMPLIANCE 
REPORT]. 
 119. Id. 
 120. For example, Jim Owens, Chairman and CEO of Caterpillar, Inc., stated that “tax makes a 
substantial difference in U.S. competitiveness,” and he specifically was troubled by the complexity of a 
tax system that results in Caterpillar spending $40 million annually on tax planning, preparation, and 
filing.  James W. Owens, Chairman & CEO, Caterpillar, Inc., Panelist at Secretary Henry M. Paulson’s 
Conference on U.S. Business Tax Competitiveness (July 26, 2007).  In addition, Mobil Oil reported that 
completing and filing its 1993 federal income tax return cost $10 million and that the return was 6,300 
pages long.  See Dennis R. Lassila & L. Murphy Smith, Tax Complexity and Compliance Costs of U.S. 
Multinational Corporations, 10 ADVANCES IN INT’L ACCT. 207, 209 (1997). 
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merely trying to comply with—and not manipulate—the laws.121  The 
U.S. tax system is estimated to impose a hidden compliance cost on all 
taxpayers of over $260 billion each year.122  This does not include the 
countless dollars spent by LBEs on tax planning in and around these 
rules, which may include pricy penalty protection opinions issued by 
their outside tax counsel.  National Taxpayers Union estimates that the 
cost for compliance by corporations is almost $160 billion, which 
comprises over 50% of corporate income taxes collected in FY 2008.123  
To be sure, although many dollars are spent in mere efforts to comply 
with the laws, additional costs borne by LBEs are done so based on the 
ex ante calculus of weighing incremental tax planning costs against the 
anticipated tax savings.  Nevertheless, even LBEs would be willing to 
trade a slightly higher effective tax rate to the extent they could realize a 
commiserate decrease in tax compliance costs.  Even if the net tax costs 
remained unchanged as a result of a cooperative regime (i.e., the 
decrease in compliance costs exactly offset the increase in taxes paid), 
LBEs would still realize the additional benefits of increased certainty 
and the ability to allocate post-filing compliance time to more 
productive efforts. 
Accordingly, if the IRS and LBEs are able to work through a majority 
of their unresolved issues pre-filing, significant cost and time savings 
could accrue to both sides.  As noted by the IRS: “Taxpayers and the 
Service often resolve issues more effectively and efficiently through a 
pre-filing examination than a post-filing examination, because the 
taxpayer and the Service have more timely access to the records and 
personnel that are relevant to the issues.”124  These pre-filing procedures 
thus benefit both taxpayers and the government by improving the quality 
of tax compliance while reducing costs, burdens, and delays.  The IRS 
recently conducted a time and cost expenditure analysis with respect to 
its PFA program, and found that on average, the Service benefited from 
an estimated 80% cost savings compared with resolving the same issue 
 121. Lassila & Smith, supra note 120, at 209–10. 
 122. J. SCOTT MOODY ET AL., TAX FOUND., SPECIAL REPORT: THE RISING COST OF COMPLYING 
WITH THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1 (2005), available at http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/sr138.pdf.  
This creates an extraordinary amount of social waste and also can result in lower profits for LBEs, 
higher prices of goods and services for customers, and decreased amounts of capital available for 
domestic and foreign investment.  Robert J. Peroni et al., Reform and Simplification of the U.S. Foreign 
Tax Credit Rules, 101 TAX NOTES 103, 105–06 (2003). 
 123. David Keating, A Taxing Trend: The Rise in Complexity, Forms, and Paperwork Burdens, 
NAT’L TAXPAYERS UNION: POLICY PAPERS, Apr. 15, 2009, at 5, available at http://www.ntu.org/ 
assets/pdf/policy-papers/pp_ntu_126.pdf (calculated using estimates of the total paperwork burden for 
corporate income taxes multiplied by the hourly wage for tax accountants). 
 124. Elliott, supra note 62. 
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post-filing.125  Similarly, taxpayers experienced an average estimated 
60% cost savings from the program.126  These cost reductions are 
substantial and support the tangible benefits that can accrue on both 
sides from increased cooperation.  Even if these savings estimates do not 
reflect all of the real costs that will be associated with a more 
widespread change in processes, they demonstrate the savings that can 
be achieved through a more cooperative approach that focuses on pre-
filing resolutions. 
C. Institutional Knowledge Gains from Increased Transparency 
Cooperative regulation can also help the IRS gain institutional 
knowledge which will help it become more efficient in performing its 
existing regulatory duties, such as drafting regulations, issuing timely 
guidance, and enforcing taxpayer compliance.  One of the biggest 
obstacles to effective enforcement at the IRS is the vast information 
asymmetry that often exists between taxpayers and the Service.127  
There are certainly intermediaries and other agencies that have their own 
withholding and disclosure duties and serve as a backstop to the 
Service’s otherwise self-reporting system.128  Nevertheless, taxpayers 
largely control the flow of information to the IRS.  If the taxpayer has 
critical information that the IRS wants to know, they are typically the 
only party in the position to provide it.  This is particularly problematic 
because tax results can turn on even the smallest of facts, and accurate, 
complete information is often necessary to calculate a taxpayer’s “true” 
tax liability. 
Today, a large bulk of the Service’s knowledge regarding taxpayer 
behaviors is gleaned from post-filing reviews of taxpayer returns.  
Unfortunately, taxpayers know where to hide items on their tax returns 
 125. Id.  See also Prepared Remarks of IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman to the New York State 
Bar Association Taxation Section Annual Meeting in New York City, 2010 TAX NOTES TODAY 17-15 
(“Today, we spend up to 25 percent of our time in a large corporate audit searching for issues rather than 
having a straightforward discussion with the taxpayer about the issues.  It would add efficiency to the 
process if we had access to more complete information earlier in the process regarding the nature and 
materiality of a taxpayer’s uncertain tax positions.”). 
 126. Elliott, supra note 62. 
 127. See generally Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When 
Is Information Reporting Warranted, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733, 1734 (2010) (“One aspect of the 
problem is that the taxpayer knows the facts regarding the relevant transactions he or she engaged in 
during the tax year—or at least has ready access to that information.  The government is forced to obtain 
that information after the fact, either from the taxpayer or from third parties.”). 
 128. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1441 (2006) (requiring tax to be withheld at source on interest, dividends, 
and other fixed or determinable annual or periodical U.S. source income paid to foreign persons); FASB 
INTERPRETATION NO. 48, supra note 74. 
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and how to befuddle the IRS examiners.129  Field agents may have an 
almost impossible time trying to reverse-engineer complex transactions 
that involve multiple entities, jurisdictions, and flows of income and 
deductions.  Initiatives such as the PFA and CAP programs, however, 
which require a certain amount of real-time collaboration with IRS 
officials, will allow the Service to become aware of and respond more 
quickly to emerging issues which they may not otherwise have known 
about or become aware of.  This will facilitate the government’s 
transition from a primarily reactive to a primarily responsive regulatory 
posture.130 
Greater institutional knowledge can significantly improve the 
effectiveness of the IRS in its dealings with taxpayers.  If certain tax 
planning techniques or structures are on the rise and the IRS becomes 
aware of them during the course of its pre-filing efforts with cooperating 
taxpayers, it will then be better equipped to address any tax treatment 
uncertainties in a responsive, rather than reactionary way.  Making the 
Service’s institutional knowledge more current with respect to emerging 
tax issues will enable it to take any number of responsive actions.  These 
actions may include working directly with affected taxpayers in real-
time to determine the most appropriate tax treatment, issuing clarifying 
or preemptive guidance to the extent the applicable law is unclear, or 
educating field agents of more pertinent issues to be focused on during 
taxpayer examinations.  As a regulating body, the IRS can only improve 
its enforcement efforts if it is more aware of what its regulatees are 
actually doing. 
D. Heightened Awareness of Tax Compliance Norms 
Although the Service’s increased knowledge may increase its power 
as a regulator, an LBE’s pre-filing collaboration with the IRS does not 
have to result in a “heads we win, tails you lose” game with the Service.  
Active communication between taxpayers and tax authorities can be a 
crucial component to forging a shared understanding of tax compliance 
 129. See generally Raskolnikov, supra note 9, at 582; Schizer, supra note 5, at 335 (noting that 
complex tax structures can be arranged to “have extraneous pieces that are included solely to befuddle 
auditors” and when “[f]acing a large and complicated return, auditors try to intuit what questions to ask, 
without really knowing where the bodies are buried”). 
 130. As noted by Daniel Shaviro, “[t]here are simply too many fault lines in the existing income 
tax laws and too many clever people laboring behind closed doors to find new ways to exploit these fault 
lines for after-the-fact prospective responses to be adequate.”  DANIEL SHAVIRO, CORPORATE TAX 
SHELTERS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: WHY THEY ARE A PROBLEM AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 23 
(2004). 
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norms and can yield benefits to both sides.131 
Ambiguity in either the applicability or content of the law can cause 
difficulties for LBEs and the Service alike in terms of increased time and 
money spent, even in attempts to merely comply with (as opposed to 
game) the tax system.  Ambiguity is not uncommon in today’s ever-
changing environment where legitimate transactions are becoming 
increasingly globalized and investment technologies are becoming more 
sophisticated.  It is impossible for the existing tax rules to stay in 
complete lockstep with the evolving landscape, and there will often be 
lag time between the emergence of new market technologies and the tax 
law that will govern them. 
Having a meeting of the minds between taxpayers and IRS officials as 
these issues arise, however, can help ameliorate these effects.  Absent 
such dialogue, the parties “may have different and genuinely held 
understandings of a rule’s meaning, and may each consider theirs the 
correct and clear” application of the law.132  Active communication 
between the parties can identify a shared compliance norm and clarify 
what is expected of each participant.  Moreover, understanding the 
opposing party’s point of view and decision-making processes can help 
forge a better understanding of not only where the law is, but also how 
the law should evolve. 
E. Lessons from Down Under: The Australian Experience 
In 1997, the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) developed a 
cooperative compliance model in consultation with its Cash Economy 
Taskforce.133  Built on core goals such as understanding taxpayer 
behavior, building a cooperative relationship with the taxpayer 
community, and encouraging support and compliance, the model put in 
place several normative goals, including: (1) advocating taxpayer 
assistance, rather than abuse, when taxpayers make mistakes through 
 131. McBarnet, TAXING DEMOCRACY, supra note 14, at 276. 
 132. Sol Picciotto, Constructing Compliance: Game Playing, Tax Law, and the Regulatory State, 
29 LAW & POL’Y 11, 12 (2007).  See also McBarnet, TAXING DEMOCRACY, supra note 14, at 276 
(observing whether a taxpayer “does what is asked of him or her is not always visible,” and “whether or 
not a person interprets the request in accordance with its intent is sometimes far from certain”). 
 133. New Zealand has also moved towards a cooperative approach.  In 2001, the newly appointed 
New Zealand Inland Revenue Commissioner through the department’s strategic document “The Way 
Forward,” and in 2002 with a training program for operative staff.  “The Way Forward” outlined four 
strategic strands: (1) streamline and simplify tax processes; (2) create an environment which promotes 
compliance; (3) enhance staff capability; and (4) enhance the administration of social policy business.  A 
compliance model, adapted from the ATO compliance model, formalized the department’s ideas for 
moving from a traditional deterrence-based approach to a more responsive regulatory system.  Job et al., 
supra note 11, at 91. 
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ignorance or poor financial planning and are prepared to come forward 
with full disclosure; (2) providing assistance to “put things right and 
move on” if taxpayers are prepared to be cooperative when anomalies 
are spotted; and (3) dedicating resources to focus persistent and 
consistent attention on the difficult cases and the “big fish,” not the “low 
hanging fruit.”134  To fulfill these goals, Australian revenue agents were 
instructed to abandon their previously contentious ways and adopt a 
softer, more cooperative approach with taxpayers.135  In fact, the 
principles of responsive regulation were incorporated into corporate 
plans, training packages for newcomers to the ATO, staff performance 
assessments, recruitment selection criteria, legislation, and in the day-to-
day operations of the field staff.136 
The ATO compliance model relies on the idea that taxpayers’ beliefs, 
values, and attitudes concerning the tax administration lead them to 
adopt a particular stance towards the tax administration.137  Depending 
on the taxpayers’ beliefs, the tax administration uses various techniques 
to achieve taxpayer cooperation.  The model resembles a pyramid in 
which it is assumed that most taxpayers are cooperative and are 
therefore at the bottom.138  The tax administration initially appeals to the 
social responsibility of the taxpayer and aims to cultivate the taxpayer’s 
good citizenship, trust, and alliance without the use of punitive measures 
that could undermine the taxpayer’s goodwill and intrinsic motivation to 
comply.139  If the taxpayer does not comply, then the tax administration 
moves proportionally higher on the pyramid and uses more authoritarian 
means of enforcement, regulation, and punitive consequences.  
However, the administration is also forgiving.  As soon as the taxpayer 
chooses cooperation, the tax administration will gradually move down 
the pyramid, de-escalating enforcement and regulation.140  Therefore, 
the taxpayer views the tax administration as cooperative unless they 
refuse to comply, and then more command-and-control techniques are 
used.  The belief is that a system which is responsive to the attitudes of 
the specific taxpayer will more adequately reign in non-compliant 
taxpayers, while sparing the compliant taxpayers from unnecessary 
tension with and fear of the tax administration. 
To be sure, Australia’s transition has not been easy.  Within the ATO, 
 134. Id. at 90. 
 135. See Raskolnikov, supra note 12, at 737. 
 136. Job et al., supra note 11, at 90. 
 137. Leviner, supra note 21, at 410. 
 138. Id. at 423. 
 139. Id. at 422. 
 140. Id. 
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the new model created significant organizational barriers.  ATO is a 
large bureaucracy, with about 19,000 people on staff split into twelve 
divisions dispersed throughout the country.141  Many of the staff, 
particularly those individuals that had been with the ATO for a long time 
and were entrenched in the old culture, had difficulty adjusting to the 
new system.142  Obstacles faced by ATO included difficulties in 
infiltrating the new vision across the entire agency and getting the staff 
to adjust to their new tasks in the new system.143  Indeed some staff 
members in certain positions believed that their jobs were being 
compromised by the new regime and were reluctant to follow the 
changes.144  These cultural and workforce adjustments were particularly 
hard given the historically anti-innovative culture of the ATO.145 
However, initial results indicate that the difficulties have been well 
worth the benefits which have accrued under the cooperative regime.  
According to the ATO, these benefits have been significant.  For 
example, the ATO has realized increases in revenue collections and 
decreases in deductions and losses claimed by high-net worth individual 
taxpayers.146  It claims to also have achieved significant results in terms 
of increased revenue in dealing with transfer pricing issues.147  Every 
Aus$1 million dollars spent by the ATO resulted in over Aus$1 billion 
extra tax collected.148  The ATO believes these outcomes are even more 
meaningful because they are related to highly sophisticated taxpayers, 
most of whom historically have been able to choose how much tax they 
wanted to pay because of their high capacity to use tax avoidance 
mechanisms that were relatively safe from ATO enforcement and 
surveillance activity.149 
While at first blush these results may seem extraordinary, they have 
come as a result of years of comprehensive and painstaking efforts to 
overhaul the entire model and culture of taxation in Australia.  
Considerable resources are needed to transform a tax system.  
Entrenchment difficulties with respect to enforcement attitudes and 
systems would be at least as arduous in the United States, if not more so.  
Additionally, because the Australian system is still fairly new, there is 
 141. Jenny Job & David Honaker, Short-Term Experience with Responsive Regulation in the 
Australian Taxation Office, in TAXING DEMOCRACY, supra note 14, at 118–20. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 118–20. 
 144. Id. at 120–23. 
 145. Id. 
 146. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, MARKETS IN VICE, MARKETS IN VIRTUE (2005). 
 147. Id. at 95. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
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no firm statistical data to highlight which of tools and reform measures 
best encourage compliance.  Nevertheless, the ATO reform has thus far 
demonstrated that the potential for sustained, improved taxpayer 
compliance is real and is worthy of serious examination in the U.S. tax 
regime. 
IV. FORCING COOPERATION 
If the Service wanted to leverage Australia’s seemingly successful 
experiment and try to realize the benefits of a cooperative regulatory 
approach, how could it shift the U.S. taxing culture away from its 
current deterrence-based paradigm?  A long-standing mistrust has settled 
in between LBEs and the government, making such a transition difficult 
to implement.  Moreover, although internal cultural and resource 
challenges at the Service may also hinder transition, the attitudes and 
behaviors of the LBEs may pose the most difficult hurdle to overcome. 
Because many LBEs believe that they are defeating the IRS in the tax 
war, they may not have the incentive to move into a cooperation-based 
program without a clear impetus to do so.  In this regard, this Article 
argues that a fundamental change must be made to the current LBE 
compliance calculus.  Although LBEs are aware of the benefits they may 
achieve through a cooperative regime, including certainty and 
potentially lower compliance costs, they may not be willing to make a 
move that could potentially put them in a worse economic position.  As 
illustrated in Figure 3 below, LBEs could be unsure as to whether they 
would end up in cooperative state A, in which the new regime would 
enable them to reap the expected benefits of cooperation because the 
uptick in actual taxes paid to the U.S. fisc would be outweighed by 
lower tax planning and compliance costs, or cooperative state B, in 
which the IRS would take advantage of its more open access to taxpayer 
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Figure 3150 
Hypothetical LBE Taxpayer 





























Given many LBEs’ past dealings with the IRS, they may have no 
reason to trust that the IRS would not use any tools at their disposal to 
drive up their ultimate tax costs.  Under the current tax regime, many 
LBEs are hesitant to pursue pre-filing resolutions, even when they have 
the opportunity and incentives to do so.  Notwithstanding their growing 
needs for certainty in reporting positions, LBEs seem reluctant to bring 
to the attention of the IRS transactions with uncertain tax consequences 
which may not otherwise be noticed upon audit because the risk of 
negative IRS interference is too high.151  Therefore, because the IRS 
may have a hard time getting LBEs to buy into a new cooperative 
strategy, they will likely have to meaningfully change tax compliance 
norms. 
In this regard, the IRS will likely have to delineate sharper 
compliance choices for taxpayers by broadening the spectrum of 
applicable compliance standards.  Similar to the strategy employed by 
the ATO, the system should be designed such that non-cooperation 
would be met with larger “sticks,” such as heightened penalties, while 
full cooperation would be met with juicier “carrots,” such as expanded 
 
 150. This graph is illustrative only.  The black bar represents the taxpayer’s total tax planning and 
compliance costs.  The white bar represents the total amount of tax paid to the U.S. government.  The 
gray bar represents the sum of the black and white bars, which equals the taxpayer’s total tax cost. 
 151. Yehonatan Givati, Resolving Legal Uncertainty: The Unfulfilled Promise of Advance Tax 
Rulings, 29 VA. TAX REV. 137, 137 (2009) (finding “[t]he strategic disadvantages of applying for an 
advance ruling usually outweigh the strategic advantages of such a request” in part because application 
for advance rulings dramatically increase the probability of IRS inspection and detection of otherwise 
borderline transactions which may not be detected upon audit). 
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pre-filing programs, lower penalty rates, and lower compliance costs.152  
When faced with the two options, rational LBE taxpayers should, over 
time, end up on the side of cooperation.  Moreover, by widening the gap 
between the two enforcement regimes, taxpayers would be forced to 
signal their cooperative intentions to the IRS.  If successfully 
implemented, the Service could then dynamically use this signaling 
information to make its post-filing efforts more effective and “force” 
more taxpayers onto the path of cooperation. 
A. Higher Penalty and Legality Standards 
In order to change the status quo in a way that will induce taxpayers 
to participate in the Service’s expanded pre-filing programs, the liability 
and legality standards for LBEs will need to be raised.  Under the 
present system, taxpayers are faced with relatively low penalty rates that 
are subject to easily invoked defenses.153  This Article proposes that all 
LBE taxpayers who are eligible for pre-filing assistance through the 
CAP and PFA programs be subject to a strict liability standard.  
Moreover, the actual standard of legality, and thereby the benchmark for 
penalties, should also be raised to “more likely than not,” regardless of 
whether the position is disclosed on the return.  When faced with the 
reality of certain penalties if they “get it wrong,” LBE taxpayers should 
respond by increasing their efforts to “get it right.”  This assurance can 
be achieved by working with the IRS pre-filing in order to resolve all 
material questions related to their returns.  If taxpayers do choose to go 
it alone, they should be less aggressive in their reporting positions in 
order to avoid being assessed penalties.  In either case, compliance 
among LBE taxpayers should increase. 
1. Current Penalty Regime 
Taxpayers engaged in non-reportable or non-tax-shelter transactions 
are generally subject to a 20% accuracy-related penalty on 
underpayments of tax that are due to negligence or disregard of the rules 
 152. See generally Ventry, supra note 11, at 436 (also supporting the use of “sweeter carrots and 
sharper sticks”). 
 153. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B) (West 2010).  In addition, penalties can be avoided if the taxpayer can 
show that they acted with reasonable cause and in good faith with respect to their underpayment.  I.R.C. 
§ 6664(c)(1) (West 2010).  The taxpayer has the burden of proof regarding reasonable cause and good 
faith and this exception is generally geared towards taxpayers having honest misunderstandings of law 
or who make inadvertent computational or transcription errors.  Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (as 
amended in 2003). 
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or to understatements that are “substantial.”154  The penalty increases to 
40% if the underpayment is the result of a gross valuation 
misstatement.155  These penalties, however, generally can be avoided 
with respect to an undisclosed position if the taxpayer has “substantial 
authority” or with respect to a disclosed position if it has a “reasonable 
basis.”156  The penalty rate is increased to 40% if the taxpayer fails to 
adequately disclose the relevant facts affecting the tax treatment in the 
return.157  Thus, if a taxpayer properly discloses his position, he will not 
be subject to the accuracy-related penalty so long as he has a reasonable 
basis for his reporting position.158  This reasonable basis standard has 
been interpreted by the government and the practicing tax bar to equate 
to a tax reporting position that has just a 20% chance of prevailing on 
the merits.159  Accordingly, as long as a taxpayer files a de minimis 
amount of factual information with his return, he can make his tax 
payments based on positions that have only a one-in-five chance of 
being the correct position. 
If a taxpayer does not disclose his position related to the 
understatement, then penalties will be assessed if the position cannot be 
supported by substantial authority.160  Substantial authority is 
established if “the weight of the authorities supporting the treatment is 
substantial in relation to the weight of authorities supporting contrary 
 154. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1)–(5).  For corporate taxpayers an understatement is substantial if the 
amount of the understatement exceeds the lesser of (a) 10% of the tax required to be shown on the return 
for that tax year (or $10,000 if that is greater), or (b) $10 million.  Id. § 6662(d)(1)(B).  A taxpayer will 
have to reach a higher standard of certainty with respect to his disclosed positions to avoid penalties 
with respect to his tax understatements if the underlying transactions are “reportable transactions” or 
“tax shelters.”  In these cases, the 20% penalty is not imposed if the position is properly disclosed, is 
backed by substantial authority, and the taxpayer reasonably believes that his tax treatment is more 
likely than not the proper treatment (i.e., greater than 50%).  I.R.C. § 6664(d)(2).  If the disclosure is not 
provided, the penalty will be raised to 30% and the reasonable belief defense, discussed below, will not 
be available.  I.R.C. § 6662A(c) (West 2010). 
 155. I.R.C. § 6662(h)(1).  In addition, for underpayments attributable to transactions entered into 
after March 30, 2010, a 20% penalty applies to an underpayment attributable to any disallowance of 
claimed tax benefits by reason of a transaction lacking economic substance or failing to meet the 
requirements of any similar rule of law.  Id. § 6662(b)(6). 
 156. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 157. I.R.C. § 6662(i)(1). 
 158. Id. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii).  A taxpayer properly discloses his position if he files a completed 
Form 8275 or 8275-R with his return.  Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6662-4(f); Rev. Proc. 2010-15, 2010-7 I.R.B. 
404. 
 159. STAFF ON THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, STUDY OF PRESENT-LAW PENALTY AND 
INTEREST PROVISIONS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 3801 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE ACT OF 
1998 (INCLUDING PROVISIONS RELATING TO CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS) 152 (Comm. Print 1999) 
[hereinafter JOINT COMMITTEE PENALTY STUDY]. 
 160. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(i). 
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treatment.”161  This position has been interpreted as requiring a taxpayer 
to have about a 40% chance of prevailing on the merits.162 
Both the accuracy related and substantial understatement penalties 
can be avoided, however, if the taxpayer can show that he acted with 
reasonable cause and in good faith with respect to his underpayment.163  
In all cases, the taxpayer has the burden of proof regarding reasonable 
cause and good faith, and the most important factor is the extent of the 
taxpayer’s efforts to ascertain its true tax liability.164  In this regard, a 
taxpayer may rely on professional advice, including an opinion of 
counsel, so long as such reliance was reasonable and the taxpayer acted 
in good faith.165 
2. Moving to Strict Liability and Higher Reporting Standard 
Because the current regime allows LBEs to easily escape penalties as 
long as they have a reasonable basis for their reporting position and they 
rely on a tax advisor, LBEs are able to consistently underpay their true 
tax liability.  According to the IRS, the true tax liability of a taxpayer is 
“the amount of tax that would be determined for the tax year in question 
if all relevant aspects of the tax law were correctly applied to all of the 
relevant facts of that taxpayer’s situation.”166  Non-compliance 
purportedly occurs when the taxpayer does not pay her true tax liability 
voluntarily and timely.167  Presumably, to be correct, a position must 
have at least a greater than 50% chance of being sustained on its merits, 
or in other words, more likely than not to be sustained on its merits. 
If this is the standard of tax legality as perceived by the government, 
then it is difficult to reconcile this correctness standard with the 
standards applicable to taxpayers to avoid penalties on their tax returns, 
 161. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3). 
 162. See JOINT COMMITTEE PENALTY STUDY, supra note 159, at 152. 
 163. I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (West 2010). 
 164. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (as amended in 2003). 
 165. Id.  A taxpayer’s reliance on a tax opinion would not be reasonable, for example, to the 
extent the opinion did not properly take into account all of the taxpayer’s relevant facts and 
circumstances.  Id. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(i).  The tax advisor’s opinion may not be relied upon to establish 
the reasonable belief of a taxpayer, however, if the tax advisor is a disqualified tax advisor.  I.R.C. 
§ 6664(d)(3)(B) (providing that an advisor is disqualified if it is (i) a material advisor or compensated by 
the material advisor, (ii) has a contingency fee based on the intended tax benefits of the transaction at 
issue, or (iii) has a disqualified financial interest in the transaction).  The opinion must also not rely on 
any unreasonable assumptions or the invalidity of a regulation.  Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(ii), (iii).  
See also I.R.C. § 6664(d)(3)(B)(iii). 
 166. See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. & U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REDUCING THE 
FEDERAL TAX GAP: A REPORT ON IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 6 (2007) (emphasis added). 
 167. Id. 
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which only require the reporting of a disclosed return position that has a 
one-in-five chance of succeeding on its merits.168  Even if an LBE’s 
reporting position is later challenged by IRS officials, in the worst case 
scenario the taxpayer’s treatment will be disallowed, and they will have 
to return the tax benefit to the IRS with appropriate interest.169  Other 
than possibly making it difficult to book a tax benefit for accounting 
purposes, this makes the ex ante risk of taxpayer aggression (at least 
down to the 20% reasonable basis threshold) near zero.  Accordingly, 
under the current penalty regime, a taxpayer is under no duty to report 
items on his tax return, with or without any additional disclosures, in a 
manner he believes reflects the correct amount of tax he should pay 
under the applicable tax rules and regulations. 
If LBEs only need to have a 20% confidence level in their reporting 
positions, it is not surprising that they are not taking more advantage of 
the pre-filing resolution programs currently offered by the Service.  
Taxpayers would need another overriding concern to seek pre-filing 
assistance, such as the booking of tax benefits for financial accounting 
reporting purposes because they should otherwise be able to achieve the 
meager required reporting standard without IRS input.  Accordingly, in 
order to move LBEs into these cooperative programs, the liability 
standards should be raised. 
In particular, LBEs should be subject to a strict liability standard with 
respect to: (1) all of their return positions if they are eligible to 
participate in CAP; and (2) all transactions which are eligible for 
resolution through the PFA process.170  If the LBE underreports, its tax 
liability in either of these situations, then penalties should be enforced 
regardless of reasonableness, good faith, or disclosure, if their reporting 
positions are not more likely than not the correct position.171  LBE 
taxpayers are sophisticated enough to be held responsible for calculating 
 168. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
 169. I.R.C. §§ 6601, 6621(a)(2) (2006). 
 170. While a transaction’s eligibility for PFA resolution should trigger the strict liability standard, 
imposing that requirement on PLR eligible transactions may not be equitable, particularly with respect 
to sensitive or proprietary transactions.  Even though the opinions are redacted, a full statement of facts, 
including details of the transaction structure, are included.  If the issue at hand does not implicate 
privacy concerns, however, a heightened standard for PLR eligible issues may also be warranted. 
 171. The disclosure distinction should not bear on the assessment of penalties because many LBEs 
are adept at reporting positions in such a way where the probability of detection is not meaningfully 
increased.  See generally Ventry, supra note 11, at 451–52 (supporting the imposition of no-fault 
penalties to reduce the gamesmanship of the current soft penalty regime); Daniel Shaviro, Disclosure 
and Civil Penalty Rules in the U.S. Legal Response to Corporate Tax Shelters 45 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of 
Law & Econ. Research Paper Series Working Paper No. 07-05, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=955354 (stating that “no-fault” penalties should not even be controversial 
because of taxpayers gaming of uncertainty in the law). 
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their actual tax liabilities, particularly when assistance is available, 
without violating any equity or fairness principles.172  Indeed, many 
LBEs are already subject to the more likely than not standard for their 
reporting of tax positions under FASB and already have to analyze each 
of their material tax positions and determine whether they meet this 
standard.173  Accordingly, if a taxpayer has the option of seeking pre-
filing resolution of an uncertain tax position, they should be strictly 
liable for penalties if they choose to forgo assistance and fail to correctly 
report their tax liability. 
B. Sweetening the Benefits of Cooperation 
While non-cooperators should be subject to more stringent 
enforcement, cooperators should be rewarded with more favorable rules 
and other benefits.  If LBEs choose to seek pre-filing assistance rather 
than be subject to strict liability, then the Service needs to have 
procedures and controls in place which ensure that they are met with 
respect and non-adversarial assistance.  If the IRS continues to employ a 
heavy handed, mistrustful, and threatening “gotcha” enforcement 
attitude, then LBEs, even in the face of strict liability, may choose to 
take their chances and go it alone.  They would be legitimately 
concerned as to what the IRS would do with open access to their tax-
related records.  Rather, as soon as a taxpayer signals that they are 
willing to be cooperators, the IRS needs to meet them halfway and work 
towards a cooperative resolution.  Moreover, in order to keep LBEs on 
the cooperative path, a proven record of cooperation and compliance 
should be further rewarded. 
1. Expansion of Pre-Filing Assistance 
In order to be able to truly capitalize on the benefits of cooperative 
regulation, it is important for LBEs to be able to get certainty with 
 172. The bar and tax regulators have clung to standards below the 50% level based on two 
misguided premises: (i) it is impossible to correctly determine one’s tax liability in all situations; and (ii) 
the tax return is an adversarial document.  See Rachelle Holmes, The Tax Lawyer as Gatekeeper, 49 U. 
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 185, 212–17 (2010).  Moreover, LBEs can take advantage of tax risk or indemnity 
insurance policies which protect them for disallowed tax benefits.  See Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law 
Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 VA. TAX REV., 339, 387–95 (2006). 
 173. FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 48, supra note 74, ¶ 6 (“The more-likely-than-not recognition 
threshold is a positive assertion that an enterprise believes it is entitled to the economic benefits 
associated with a tax position.  The determination of whether or not a tax position has met the more-
likely-than-not recognition threshold shall consider the facts, circumstances, and information available 
at the reporting date.”). 
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respect to as many of their material tax issues as possible before filing 
the return.  As outlined above, however, the current PLR, PFA, and CAP 
programs only capture a very small portion of LBE taxpayers.  PLRs are 
only issued under certain conditions and the results are publicly 
disclosed, albeit on a no-names basis.  In addition, the IRS only takes on 
a limited number of PFAs each year.174  CAP is a by-invitation-only 
program with only one hundred participants.175  Accordingly, these 
programs would have to be expanded well beyond their present scope in 
order to maximize the potential payoffs of the responsive regulation 
model.  In addition, informal ad hoc advice should be more readily 
available and perhaps even serve as a reasonable defense to the strict 
liability standard. 
With just over 20,000 total enforcement officers and agents,176 the 
IRS cannot realistically open up CAP to all of its roughly 20,000 LBE 
taxpayers.177  It would have to roll out the program gradually.  Initial 
expansion among public companies makes the most sense because these 
companies are already involved in real-time assessments of their 
outstanding material tax issues in order to comply with their quarterly 
FIN 48 reporting requirements.  It also makes sense to transition 
resources that are currently being used for post-filing audits to pre-filing 
resolutions.  Eventually, however, CAP should be available to as many 
of the top quartile of LBE taxpayers as possible or whatever number the 
IRS determines constitutes a majority of its LBE tax revenues.  Broad 
availability is particularly important if the Service wants to capitalize on 
the sorting and signaling benefits provided by an opt-in cooperative 
regime, discussed below in Part IV.C.  For those taxpayers for which 
CAP is not feasible or practical, PFAs and PLRs should be made more 
widely available.  The IRS should lift many of the limitations it 
currently has in place, including restrictions on international transactions 
and controversial questions of law, and allow taxpayers to have a quick 
and cooperative means for which to settle one-off tax issues pre-filing. 
Outside of the official pre-filing avenues, pre-filing communication 
with the IRS can be counterproductive, as unofficial or informal IRS 
 174. See supra Figure 2. 
 175. See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text. 
 176. IRS FY 2009 RESULTS, supra note 24. 
 177. This number is an estimate based on the number of tax returns filed by C corporations, 
partnerships, and S corporations with reported assets of $250 million or greater (14,673, 4,375 and 660, 
respectively).  Id. (reporting FY 2009 return numbers for C corporations); TREASURY INSPECTOR 
GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, FILING CHARACTERISTICS AND EXAMINATION RESULTS FOR 
PARTNERSHIPS AND S CORPORATIONS, REF. NO. 2006-30-114 (2006), available at 
http://www.treas.gov/tigta/auditreports/2006reports/200630114fr.html#fig2 (reporting processing year 
2006 return numbers for partnerships and S corporations). 
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advice is not binding on the IRS or its representatives, even when it is 
erroneous.178  IRS agents often give informal oral or written advice to 
taxpayers in an effort to help taxpayers understand the Service’s 
viewpoint on a question.  However, the utility of this advice is severely 
limited because it does not represent an official ruling, and the IRS is 
able to change its position if it is beneficial for it to do so.  Thus, 
taxpayers have been warned that they should rely on this kind of 
informal advice “at [their] peril.”179  If the Service wants to enter into a 
cooperative compliance regime, however, then it will not only need to 
make the availability of informal advice more widespread, but also 
increase taxpayers’ ability to rely on that advice.180 
2. Preferred Review Status 
The cost and resources required to participate in ongoing real-time 
audits with the IRS is not trivial.  As such, taxpayers may not be willing 
to enter CAP if the payoff for the dedication of extensive resources does 
not extend beyond a single filing cycle.  Moreover, as CAP participants 
go through several tax filing cycles, they should develop a good 
understanding of the Service’s expected tax compliance norms.  
Similarly, the IRS should have gained significant insight into the 
taxpayers’ filing habits and practices.  As a result, it may be appropriate 
at some point (e.g., after five years of participation without any 
significant issues) to consider implementing a multi-year preferred 
compliance program, including a potential moratorium on standard audit 
activity.181  Taxpayers could instead have shorter, more focused reviews 
of their returns, and preferential access to the PFA and PLR processes 
on an as-needed basis.  These taxpayers should also be able to have 
increased access to informal ad hoc advice that will be able to assist 
them in gaining certainty pre-filing and shield them from strict 
liability.182 
Notwithstanding the potential negative political perception of relaxed 
 178. See, e.g., Clarke v. Comm’r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 398 (1994); Ferreira v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Summary Op. 2001-167.  Moreover, the IRS is not stopped from later correcting errors of law that it 
makes in advice to taxpayers.  See, e.g., Demirjian v. Comm’r, 457 F.2d 1 (3d. Cir. 1972), aff’g 54 T.C. 
1691 (1970) (where taxpayer claimed detrimental reliance on a letter from the district director). 
 179. United Block Co. v. Helvering, 123 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1941). 
 180. For example, it may be able to for a rebuttable presumption against the imposition of 
penalties. 
 181. LMSB Subgroup Report, supra note 90. 
 182. A LBEs former CAP Account Coordinator, for example, may be able to provide this type of 
assistance in a relatively cost effective manner because of his or her in-depth familiarity with the 
taxpayer’s filing history. 
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oversight of the cooperative LBEs, moving proven compliant taxpayers 
into a more lenient process, at least for a predetermined number of years, 
will allow the IRS to free up significant resources and bring new 
taxpayers into the CAP system.183  In addition, some kind of fail-safe 
mechanism could be put in place which would only extend a taxpayer’s 
preferred status grace period to the extent that no material issues come 
up during subsequent spot reviews.  This would help keep taxpayers 
from taking advantage of their relaxed oversight and give the IRS a 
mechanism by which they can bring offending taxpayers back into pre-
CAP status if necessary. 
C. The Sorting Effect 
Changing to a strict default penalty level for LBE taxpayers, while 
contemporaneously expanding pre-filing assistance, will have the effect 
of providing a sorting mechanism for two kinds of taxpayers: 
cooperators and non-cooperators.184  Cooperators, or those who elect to 
opt-in to CAP or have issues resolved under the other pre-filing 
programs, will signal that they are willing to be open and transparent 
with the IRS in order to gain certainty with respect to their tax filing 
positions.  It is likely that these taxpayers are ones that either already 
lean towards the more conservative side of the tax evasion/tax avoidance 
line, or are willing to forgo future aggressive planning activities in order 
to reap the economic benefits of cooperation.185  Non-cooperators, on 
the other hand, are much less likely to elect into CAP or use the other 
pre-filing cooperative mechanisms.  It is more likely that these taxpayers 
are either pursuing tax avoidance strategies in a way that will be looked 
at unfavorably by the IRS or their general distrust for the IRS is so high 
that they believe that any type of cooperation that requires transparency 
will lead to a disproportionate increase in their tax liabilities.  Even with 
respect to the latter type of taxpayer, however, this level of mistrust is 
likely to be higher if the taxpayer is a more aggressive filer.  As such, 
non-cooperators will send a general signal that they have “something to 
hide.”186 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that sorting on a smaller scale is already 
 183. See generally Ventry, supra note 11, at 436 (noting a benefit of cooperative regulation is the 
ability to better allocate post-filing enforcement resources). 
 184. This distinction will be akin to the categories of “gamers” and “non-gamers” put forth by 
Alex Raskolnikov.  See Raskolnikov, supra note 12, at 689. 
 185. It is assumed that the CAP IRS agents’ abilities will be sufficiently respected such that the 
cooperators are in fact largely transparent in their disclosures with the Service. 
 186. Nanci S. Palmintere et al., Session 10: Risk of Controversy with the Tax Authorities, 85 
TAXES 137, 163 (2007). 
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occurring.  The IRS believes that one reason for the drop in PFAs in 
recent years, as illustrated in Figure 2 above, is because some of the very 
same taxpayers who would have come in for PFAs in prior years are 
now involved in the CAP program.187  This is a logical assertion because 
both programs involve real-time reviews of taxpayer issues (PFA 
addressing single and CAP addressing multiple issues) and require a 
posture of transparency and cooperation with the IRS.  This suggests 
that there is a distinct set of taxpayers who are eager cooperators (i.e., 
are willing to cooperate in the absence of any added pressure to do so).  
If, as is suggested, CAP is expanded to be an opt-in regime for a larger 
subset of LBE filers, sorting on a greater scale should occur.  This 
sorting mechanism could be particularly robust with respect to large 
LBEs already under continuous post-filing audit if the IRS gives those 
taxpayers the option to move some of its post-filing personnel resources 
to work with the taxpayer on its pre-filing issues.  Cooperators should 
sign up, while non-cooperators should resist.188  The IRS can then use 
these signals being sent by LBEs to force even greater cooperation and 















 187. Elliott, supra note 62, at 45-2 (“There’s a sense that some of our CAP taxpayers are the very 
same taxpayers that would have come in for prefiling agreements.  It’s possible that, absent CAP, we 
would be seeing different prefiling agreement numbers today.” (quoting Cheryl Claybough, director of 
pre-filing and technical guidance in LMSB)). 
 188. Raskolnikov, supra note 12, at 738 (“[I]mproved taxpayer assistance is likely not only to 
facilitate the separation of gamers from the rest, but to increase compliance among non-gamers as 
well.”). 
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An expansion of CAP should improve the overall effectiveness of 
post-filing audits in three meaningful ways.  First, as more LBEs opt-in 
to CAP, fewer companies will require time-consuming post-filing audits.  
The majority of LBEs participating in CAP should reach agreement on 
all material issues such that no or limited post-filing reviews are needed.  
Second, because of the sorting that is accomplished by CAP, the post-
filing audit efforts that are expended by the Service will be focused on 
those institutions which have signaled that they may have something to 
hide.  Assuming that largely compliant taxpayers will choose to opt-in, 
resources currently directed at would-be cooperators will be able to be 
directed towards non-cooperators. 
Lastly, an expanded CAP should help increase post-filing audit 
detection rates.  A significant stumbling block with respect to LBE 
audits now is that the IRS has trouble identifying areas of non-
compliance on the return.  As discussed above, field agents must sift 
through thousands of pages of information, in which taxpayers may have 
tried to intentionally obscure the presence of any wrongdoing.189  Under 
the proposed cooperative regime, however, non-cooperators should find 
their aggressive positions being discovered more often on audit.  Service 
agents will have the advantage of possessing real-time information 
learned from cooperators, which should make it significantly easier to 
identify current areas of compliance concern and newly developed 
structured tax transactions.  Even if the cooperators are on the whole less 
aggressive than non-cooperators, the IRS will still learn valuable 
information because sometimes the mere existence of a certain type of 
transaction or market technology is beneficial to enforcement efforts, 
even if the specific cooperative taxpayer at hand has not decided to take 
the most aggressive reporting position.  It is also possible that certain 
cooperator LBEs may strategically choose to propose new aggressively 
reported transactions to CAP or PFA agents in order to ensure equal tax 
treatment with non-cooperators.  If the IRS signs off on a particular 
strategy then they, along with their competitors, will be able to book the 
tax benefits.  On the other hand, if the Service shoots down the tax 
treatment, the IRS may then issue preemptive guidance which will 
prevent their non-cooperator competitors from taking the benefits as 
well. 
Ultimately, more effective auditing should move non-cooperators 
more in line with cooperators.  Eventually, the rewards of cooperation 
(i.e., immediate certainty, no strict liability, and decreased planning and 
compliance costs) should outweigh the shrinking benefits of evasion and 
 189. See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text. 
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gamesmanship.  This should cause more former non-cooperators to opt-
in.  As more non-cooperators opt-in, a super-sorting function will begin 
to occur as the last non-cooperators to hold out will most likely be the 
LBEs with the most to hide.  As this number decreases, IRS efforts can 
be adjusted to increasingly target these entities until they too are forced 
to cooperate. 
D. Challenges and Consequences of a Cooperative Compliance Model 
1. A Necessary Change in Culture 
Both IRS personnel and taxpayers are entrenched in their respective 
antagonistic postures.  Shifting to a cooperative model may be 
procedurally and psychologically difficult to implement.  Taxpayers 
may legitimately fear that any revelation of their tax plans pre-filing 
may result in harsh scrutiny and disproportionately high tax liabilities.  
As discussed above, current CAP participants have already complained 
that the Service has not embraced the cooperative spirit of the program 
and have been very antagonistic, intrusive, and oppressive.190  However, 
under a cooperative model, not only should the IRS cultivate trust 
among taxpayers, but it should also deal with taxpayers openly and 
honestly and “give taxpayers the benefit of the doubt when it finds a 
mistake, by sanctioning small violations more mildly, and by 
sanctioning large . . . violations more heavily.”191  A cooperative tax 
regime will be unsustainable if the IRS cannot evolve out of its 
adversarial posture. 
Like the ATO, which had significant difficulties in changing its large 
bureaucratic organizational structure to support its new cooperative 
model,192 the IRS has over 16,000 employees all over the country 
engaged in various agency enforcement and compliance tasks.193  
Getting all of these employees, or at least the ones dealing with LBEs, to 
buy into a new culture of cooperation and accommodation will likely be 
very difficult.  Many of the IRS personnel have been submerged in a 
deterrent environment pitting them directly against taxpayers for the 
entirety of their careers.  Extensive training and cultural rehabilitation 
would be necessary in order to change their mindsets and dispositions.194 
 190. Coder, supra note 82, at 55-3. 
 191. McCaffery & Slemrod, supra note 11, at 20 (describing policy recommendations of “tax 
morale” literature). 
 192. See generally Job & Honaker, supra note 141. 
 193. TIGT FY2009 COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 118. 
 194. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., OVERSIGHT BD., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: 2009, at 
53 (2010), available at http://www.treas.gov/irsob/reports/2010/IRSOB%20Annual%20Report% 
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2. The Need for More Elite IRS Talent 
Under a cooperative tax regime, the IRS will need more top talent.  In 
order for any pre-filing assistance, in the form of CAP, PFAs, or PLRS 
to be worthwhile and not result in a disproportionate decrease in 
government revenue, the IRS personnel will need to be sophisticated 
enough to work through complex tax issues with the LBEs on equal 
footing.195  That is, even if the LBEs are fully transparent and 
forthcoming with the government during these processes, the IRS 
personnel involved in making the ultimate agreed-to determinations 
must be able to fully comprehend the intricacies of the transactions at 
issue and the ramifications their decisions may have beyond the 
immediate taxpayer’s return.  To the extent that LBEs feel like they can 
get one over on the Service agents brought in under CAP, they are likely 
to revert to non-cooperative, clandestine behaviors under the guise of 
full transparency.  Such a scenario would put the government in an even 
worse position than it is currently in because under the CAP and PFA 
agreements, it will be more difficult to go back and unwind or penalize 
taxpayers unless egregious violations are found. 
Thus, not only will the IRS need more bodies to execute a 
comprehensive responsive regulatory system, but many of those bodies 
will ideally need to consist of some of the nation’s top legal minds.  
While salary competitions between the government, law firms, and 
LBEs would almost undoubtedly disfavor the government, Congress 
should be mindful of the real cost savings that can be achieved by 
implementing this approach and be willing to re-allocate some of the 
capture into efforts to procure more elite tax talent. 
3. Other Issues 
In addition to cultural changes, the IRS will have to deal with other 
challenges such as budgeting limitations and guarding against 
corruption.  First, because it is more difficult to quantify results in CAP 
compared with the traditional audit process, allocating resources will 
pose a challenge for the government.  The IRS has historically been 
limited in resources and funds even when workload increases.196  In 
order to get the funding necessary to meaningfully expand the pre-filing 
202009.pdf (recounting a panel discussion in which it was acknowledged that “to change an 
organizational culture takes a very long time and a committed leadership over a period of years”). 
 195. See generally Schizer, supra note 5 (exploring ways in which the Service can upgrade its tax 
talent). 
 196. See generally Ventry, supra note 11, at 456. 
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programs, it will be necessary to convince the budget makers of the 
long-term benefits.197 
Second, to the extent individual IRS personnel are given latitude in 
dealing with individual taxpayers through the pre-filing resolution 
programs, it is important to protect against corruption and agency 
capture, which can increase when authority is devolved in a system with 
high levels of discretion.198  While it is important to balance the need for 
consistent decision-making and equity against the considerations of 
individual taxpayer circumstances, disparate treatment by IRS agents 
among taxpayers can undermine the integrity of the cooperative system. 
CONCLUSION 
There is an old proverb that you can catch more flies with honey than 
with vinegar.  The government and the IRS, however, have continued to 
use increasingly harsh methods to procure taxpayer compliance.  The 
failures of the Service’s current deterrence-based model and the success 
of Australia’s cooperative transformation should prompt the government 
to seriously consider instituting a more friendly tax regime.  Although 
the cultural and psychological barriers that exist for both LBEs and the 
IRS as a result of their long-lasting adversarial postures towards each 
other are significant, the rewards of a successfully implemented 
cooperative regime should make the costs and pains of transition 
worthwhile. 
Once a cooperative compliance norm is established, both sides should 
be able to realize greater benefits than they do under the existing 
deterrence model.  Although many LBEs may not willingly buy into the 
new accommodative system, they can be induced to do so.  This Article 
proposes a framework for helping induce and transition LBEs and the 
IRS into a new cooperative compliance era.  The multi-faceted approach 
will not only help reduce uncertainty and the compliance costs of 
taxpayers, but also augment IRS enforcement efforts by providing a 
dynamic sorting mechanism that enables them to better target non-
cooperators.  Although the implementation of this cooperative model 
would be an extreme undertaking, it has become increasingly clear that 
the IRS can no longer afford to continue with the status quo if it intends 
 197. This is more challenging with the “pay as you go” norms employed by lawmakers, which are 
designed to ensure that the cost of any government spending increase or tax cut is offset by a 
simultaneous equal spending cut or tax increase. 
 198. See, e.g., Job et al., supra note 11, at 92; see also Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican 
Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1565 (1992) (defining the capture 
hypothesis). 
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to use the corporate tax base as a significant source of income going 
forward. 
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